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The recently recognized phenomenon termed transnational organized crime, which makes 
headlines daily and is often on the top of governmental agendas, is in fact not a new 
phenomenon. Crime transcending borders is an ancient and well established occurrence, 
yet post 1980 there has been an undeniable surge in such activities. These recent surges 
can be attributed to new criminal opportunities, many of which are created by 
globalization. Globalization provides a convincing explanation for the current prevalence 
of criminal activities, particularly advanced fee fraud also referred to as '419 scams' or 
simply '419s'. Advanced fee fraud in its contemporary manifestation originated in 
Nigeria in the 1980s and today poses a considerable threat to developing and developed 
nations alike. The dissertation traces the development of advanced fee fraud in Nigeria. 
I attempt to uncover the factors inherent in Nigeria that can be interpreted as favorable or 
conducive to the perpetration of advanced fee fraud and whether this relatively new crime 
has roots in more traditional forms of organized crime. Furthermore, this dissertation 
attempts to analyze the implications of globalization on advanced fee fraud by 
illuminating certain aspects of globalization which serve to facilitate the modus operandi 
of groups involved in transnational fraud and money laundering. Neoliberal economic 
policies advocated by prominent international financial institutions, such as privatization 
and deregulation of the financial sector, are of particular interest and their effect on the 
opportunities and available methods of conducting transnational fraud are examined. The 
dissertation beings with an overview of transnational organized crime in the West African 
region and an introduction to advanced fee fraud. The subsequent chapters deal with the 
history of organized crime in Nigeria, the impact of globalization and new technology, 
and the deregulation of the international financial markets all of which appear to play 
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Chapter 1 An Inquiry into the Causality of Nigerian Organized Crime 
1: An Inquiry into the Causality of Nigerian Organized Crime 
The West African state of Nigeria has in recent times been catapulted into the global 
arena and has earned itself a notorious reputation for organized crime activity, especially 
advanced fee fraud. Newspapers everyday carry headlines of Nigerian fraudsters duping 
oblivious victims into wiring them cash or perpetrators selling bank account details which 
are salvaged from the hard disks of donated computers. These stories grab attention for 
many reasons, the main factor being the pervasiveness of these scams and the threat of 
identity theft in industrialized nations at unprecedented levels. Many still are amazed that 
a nation historically involved in the traditional organized crimes, such as drug and human 
trafficking, is now at the forefront of a type of white collar crime. What is responsible 
for the unprecedented rates of transnational fraud originating from Nigeria and why 
Nigerian nationals in particular have become so adept at perpetrating fraudulent schemes 
are the principal issues this study will attempt to explain. 
1.1 An overview of transnational organized crime in West Africa 
The West African region is comprised of seventeen states, of which Nigeria is both the 
most populated within the region and in the African continentI and is one of the few 
major economic powerhouses in Africa. The West African region's turbulent history is 
characterized by ancient feuding empires, followed by the slave trade and the scramble 
for African territories largely by Britain and France, and increasing bouts of 
independence after World War II. West Africa's postcolonial history is rich in civil wars, 
inter-state wars, military coups, and its contemporary history is no less chaotic: political 
I United Nations Statistics Division, Composition o/macro geographical (continental) regions, 
geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings, (2006) [Online]. Available: 










Chapter 1 An Inquiry into the Causality of Nigerian Organized Crime 
and economic instability, extensive corruption, food crises, and exploitation of natural 
resources are all common practice today. All these factors are characteristic of the West 
African region in addition to widespread domestic criminal activity, of which Nigeria 
particularly has a well established history, and which inevitably serves as a precursor for 
transnational forms of crime2. 
Recently, West Africa has been recognized with unusually high rates of transnational 
organized crime, particularly transnational fraud, drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, 
and human trafficking3. Nigeria is often seen as the leader and instigator of this regional 
trend with high rates of all four activities concentrated within its borders: The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) quotes the United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration: "Nigeria and Nigerian drug traffickers dominate the 
African drug trade ... [they] are well established in other parts of West Africa, Southeast 
Asia, and Europe and are rapidly entrenching themselves in such places as the former 
Communist bloc countries, South Africa, Russia, Brazil, New Zealand, and the 
Philippines" 4. The Nigerian Criminal Enterprises are typically recognized as leaders in 
terms of financial fraud with worldwide losses from transnational fraud connected to 
2 According to the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress: "Domestic criminal activity is 
recognized as a key foundation for transnational crime, especially as the forces of globalization intensify". 
See: The Library of Congress, Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism, (2003) [Online]. 
Available: http://www.fas.org/irp/ciaJproductlfrdl003.pdf[2006, November 13]. 1. 
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in the West 
African Region, (2005) [Online]. Available: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/transnationatcrime_west-africa-
05.pdf[2006, November 13].20. 
4 The UNODC notes "a particularly flourishing trade in prostitutes exists from Nigeria." See: UNODC, 
Why Fighting Crime can Assist Development in Africa: Summary, (2005) [Online]. Available: 











Chapter 1 An Inquiry into the Causalitv of Nigerian Organized Crime 
Nigeria estimated at $4 billions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also 
identifies Nigerian Organized Crime Networks as "the most significant of the African 
Criminal Enterprises" with operations in over 80 countries6 , Charles Tive points out that 
"transnational financial crime is not peculiar to Nigeria; it is a general and global problem 
that emerged when the world metamorphosed from a 'large world' to a 'global village"', 
but advanced fee fraud in particular is an ", .. aspect of financial crime with a modus 
operandi peculiar to the Nigerian society,,7. Why and how Nigeria has emerged as the 
key regional player in transnational organized crime activity are questions this study will 
seek to answer with a specific focus on why Nigeria is so conducive to financial crimes. 
No doubt the history of the state, which includes a violent history of military dictators, 
coups and counter-coups, civil war, the discovery of oil and resultant petrodollars, 
endemic corruption, and political instability despite the formation of a Democratic 
Republic modeled after the West, all synergistically serve to directly and indirectly create 
an environment that facilitates various forms of criminal activity, much of which is 
transnational in nature. 
It is widely believed that much criminal activity occurs when opportunities for legitimate 
income making are scarce, thus resulting in the formation of a booming informal 
5 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Investigative programs organized crime: African criminal 
enterprises, (no date) [Online]. Available: http://www.tbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/aace/africancrim.htm [2006, 
November 13]. 
6 Ibid. 
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Furthennore the economic implications of globalization, particularly the 
liberalization of the market sans adequate oversight and regulation, which are typically 
pushed by Structural Adjustment Programmes and have been incorporated in the 
Nigerian economy by the Obasanjo government and earlier administrations, confer 
various benefits on transnational criminal groups; these include easier access into 
previously constrained areas, opportunities to liaise with other criminal networks, and the 
ability to assume the role and social responsibilities of the government by offering the 
ordinary public income-seeking avenues. And the technological advancements 
associated with the processes of globalization, especially those in the realm of the global 
financial industry, allow organized crime groups to conduct their activities with increased 
efficiency, speed, and anonymity. This particularly serves to enhance the feasibility of 
transnational fraud activity; for example, the internet served to revolutionize advanced 
fee fraud in Nigeria by allowing scammers to replace the postal service and the fax 
machine with email, thus allowing fraudsters access to uncountable numbers of people at 
a fraction of the cost. The FBI sums up the prospects for criminal activity provided by 
globalization in Africa: 
The ease of international travel, expanded world trade, and financial transactions 
that cross national borders have enabled African Criminal Enterprises to expand 
their roles from more traditional local and regional criminal groups to that of 
targeting international victims and developing criminal networks within countries 
and regions of the world with greater prosperity. The political, social, and 
economic conditions in African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia 
have contributed significantly to some criminal ethnic groups from these countries 
developing criminal enterprises worldwide ... 9 
8 Daniel Bach believes that "Today, in many countries the so-called parallel or illegal cross-border 
transactions contribute to a vital diversification of urban income sources and exert a buffer function when 
salaries undergo a sharp decline ... the parallel circuits supply consumers with food, fuel and manufactured 
goods while creating earning opportunities ... " See: Daniel Bach, "New Regionalism as an Alias: 
Regionalization through Trans-State Networks", in 1. Andrew Grant and Fredrik Soderbaum, eds., The New 
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Nigeria has become notoriously synonymous with advanced fee fraud, commonly 
referred to as 419 scams and named after the section of the Nigerian Criminal Code 
which prohibits the practice lO • The terms 'advanced fee fraud' and '419s' are often used 
interchangeably in addition to other labels to describe the schemes such as 'the Nigerian 
Connection'. These scams are typically conducted via the internet in the form of 
emotional and official emails that encourage the recipient to release funds to pay for 
various fees incurred for a previously promised larger sum. They range from simple 
spam messages to intricate and extensive schemes all intended to dupe the receiver into 
paying in advance for a promised profit or service that is never delivered. 
1.2 How advanced fee fraud/419 scams work 
In a nutshell, transnational organized crimes are "Offenses whose inception, prevention, 
and/or direct effect or indirect effects involve more than one country" 11. However a more 
extensive definition classifies an offense as transnational if: 
(a) it is committed in more than one State; (b) it is committed in one State but a 
substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in 
another State; (c) it is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal 
group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) it is 
committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State 12 . 
Advanced fee fraud or 419 scams are a type of transnational organized crime. More 
specifically they are defined as "attempts to obtain pre-payment for goods or services that 
10 Femi Ajayi, The politics of '419 ': Internationalizing Nigerian criminal code, Chapter 38 Section '419', 
(2002) [Online] Available: http://nigeriaworld.com/columnist/ajayi/0321 02.html [2006, November 13]. 
11 Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (CBASSE), Transnational organized 
crime: Summary of a workshop, (1999) [Online]. Available: 
http://darwin.nap.edu/books/0309065755/htmI/S.html [2006, October 23]. 
12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Trajlicking in persons: Global palterns, (2006) 
[Online]. Available: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/traffickinginpersons _report_ 2006ver2. pdf [2006, 











Chapter 1 An Inquiry into the Causality of Nigerian Organized Crime 
do not actually exist or which the proposer does not actually intend to deliver"l3, 
According to Interpol, the classic course of action for a Nigerian 419 scam begins with a 
letter, typically in the form of an email, by an unknown sender promising an especially 
lucrative business deal. The bulk of the 419 letters share the same format and include 
common features: The sender will often state that he or she is a relative or a trusted friend 
of distinguished businessmen or a high ranking member of government who is now 
deceased due to some extraordinary circumstance. Before their death, however, the 
person had deposited a substantial sum of money, typically ranging from $800,000 to 
$100,000,000, into a Nigerian bank account. The sender claims to have legal rights to the 
account and needs help in transferring the money into a foreign bank account. The 
recipient of the scam is promised between 15-50% of the cash for their assistance in the 
transferl4 • Another classic mode of operation includes a direct request by an alleged 
prominent member of the government to transfer "over-invoiced" funds into the 
recipient's personal account. Bank account details, blank company letterheads, and other 
documents are requested in order to conduct the transfer. The scammers also send 
official looking forged documents typically bearing the names of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) intended to lend 
credibility to the fraudsters and mitigate feelings of suspicion by the victim. The crucial 
element of the scam, however, is the various handling fee requests or what is referred to 
as the 'advance fee(s)' and this scenario is played out countless times during the course 
of the scam; the victim is assured that his cut of the profit is about to be released to him 
but suddenly an unforeseen obstacle appears, keeping the victim from his promised cash 
13 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West Aji-ican Region, 24. 
1-1 Interpol, Financial fraud, (2005) [Online]. Available: 
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payout. The apparent obstacles range from bank managers and government officials that 
need bribing to various fictitious taxes that need paying before the money can be 
transferred. The victim, considering the substantial sum promised to him, is easily duped 
into paying these fees in advance inevitably losing significant accounts of money in the 
process. In some cases, the victim is urged to travel to Nigeria or a bordering country to 
complete the transaction and is assured that a visa is unnecessary or that one has been 
arranged. In fact, there exists no visa and entering Nigeria without proper documentation 
is considered a serious crime warranting imprisonment; the fraudsters may use this in 
addition to threats of physical violence to induce the victim into releasing even more 
money once inside the country15, 
There also exist slight variations of these 419 scams typically by fax or post that targeted 
businesses throughout the 1990's and were used before many groups switched to mass 
and indiscriminate emailing. These variations included black currency schemes, contract 
fraud, extortion, real estate fraud, wills apparently containing bequeathments, in addition 
to selling oil by the barrel at below market prices or over invoicing of oi1 16. The common 
thread between these schemes, besides undeniable creativity, is that victims end up being 
manipulated into paying a fee, or in most cases many fees, in advance with the 
expectation that they will eventually receive some product or service, hence the term 
advanced fee fraud. 
15 419 eater, What is the 419 scam?, (no date) [Online]. Available: 
http://wwwAI9eater.comlhtmIl419faq.htm [2006, November 13]. 
16 419 Coalition, Nigerian scam: Sample 419 letters, (no date) [Online] Available: 
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An interesting and slightly divergent manifestation of the Nigerian 419 scams is the 
Black Currency schemes. These scams were initially limited to duping local Nigerians 
and were referred to as 'wash-wash' and were perpetrated by con men known as 'guy 
men', which was the local term for perpetrators of all types of advanced fee fraud 17. 
Today these schemes are no longer confined within the borders of Nigeria but have 
become transnational in nature. Contemporary black currency schemes classically 
involve large sums of allegedly genuine money, typically dollars that have been colored 
black chemically in order to smuggle the notes out of the country without them being 
detected. The victim is told that the notes can be restored to their original condition with 
a special cleaning agent that costs anywhere between $10,000 to $500,000. The victim is 
typically invited to Nigeria to view the notes and for hislher assistance in covering the 
cleaning agent costs, is offered a significant percentage of the restored cash. To ease the 
mind of skeptical victims, legitimate notes are often strategically placed among the 
bundles of fraudulent notes which are washed in front of the victim who is then 
encouraged to take them to hislher bank for verification18. Once convinced, the payment 
is made for the cleaning agent and the victim is subsequently left with suitcases full of 
worthless paper19. 
17 Tive, 10. 
IS Ibid, 79. 
19 Interpol, Financialfraud. Furthermore "These schemes are diverse and target not only individuals but 
businesses and government offices as well. Insurance fraud involving automobile accidents, healthcare 
billing scams, and life insurance schemes are tremendously profitable for Nigerian Criminal Enterprises. 
Bank, check, and credit card fraud schemes are also very lucrative. Advance Fee schemes, also known as 4-
1-9 letters are worldwide problems, especially with the advent of Internet e-mail systems. Document fraud, 
to develop false identities, contributes to the difficulty of law enforcement in all countries to stem the flow 
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Life insurance scams are a lesser known variation of the typical Nigerian advanced fee 
fraud but are hugely popular among fraudsters. In these scams, the fraudster insures a 
fictitious person through reputable insurance companies typically in Europe or America. 
Soon after the person has been successfully insured, the fraudster claims that the person 
has died suddenly in an accident and supplies the insurance company with fraudulent 
documents such as death certificates and coroners reports to validate the claim, inevitably 
receiving payment for the fictitious death of a fictitious person20 • 
Creativity and foresight are undeniable attributes of the successful Nigerian fraudster. 
Nigerian documents are typically easy to forge or replicate because victims from 
industrialized countries are not familiar with what the official documents should look like 
and are easily duped into believing bogus letterheads and seals. These fraudsters will 
even go so far as to tamper with their surroundings to convince visiting victims of the 
legitimacy of their schemes. Charles Tive, a former Nigerian police officer, narrates 
accounts in which 419 men not only assumed the identity of prominent government 
officials but disguised their offices in rural Nigerian towns as official buildings 
successfully convincing victims that they were indeed involved in official government 
business2 ! . 
Despite the often crude and implausible nature of some Nigerian advanced fee scams, 
victims repeatedly fall prey to the lucrative promises and the largest reported loss for a 
20 Tive, 2. 
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single 419 scam to date is a quarter of a billion dollars22, And victims of these scams are 
not limited to your average gullible citizens, but come from a vast range of backgrounds; 
former United States congressman from Iowa Edward Mezvinsky as well as other figures 
such as prominent American priests and psychotherapists have all been lured and 
inevitably taken by 419 con men23 , A major reason why Nigerian fraudsters are able to 
find victims interested in their proposals is often attributed to the greed of victims on the 
other end to make a quick and easy fortune, despite knowing the proposition is outside 
the bounds of legality, Operationally speaking, the 419 scams have been so successful 
due in part to the huge number of solicitations they send out: On a daily basis, a single 
419 enterprise on average sends out fifty 419 proposals to various addresses typically in 
Europe, America, Asia, and South Africa. In Lagos alone, there are 200 such enterprises 
resulting in approximately 10,000 advanced fee fraud proposals a day24. The origins of 
these scams are traced to the period between the late 1970's and the 1980's, or the time of 
the Nigerian Oil Boom, when imports and access to world markets for Nigerians were 
unprecedented. Some Nigerians in government began to employ the practice of over-
invoicing which is believed to be the predecessor to the infamous 419 scams of today25. 
Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations also trace Nigerian advanced fee fraud to the 
1970's when the country had recently discovered oil and the main targets of the initial 
22 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 26. 
23 Mitchell Zuckoff, Annals of crime: The perfect Alark, (2006) [Online]. Available: 
hrtp:llwww.newyorker.com/printables/fact/060515fajact [2006, November 13]. 
24 Tive, 106. 
25 " ... through collusion between government officials and foreign businesses, imported goods were over-
invoiced, resulting in the transfer of huge resources from the country without the supply of goods and 
services. The West became used to money being stolen into foreign countries with the collusion of 
foreigners. This was the precursor to the current financial scam and the reasons why western conspirators 
actually believed the financial scam perpetrators .... The process of liberalization also reduced the foreign 
exchange controls and led to the deregulation of financial and banking services, which may have 
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scams were businesses in Europe and Africa26 , Interpol contends that 419 scams, by 
letter, fax, and/or email, can be traced to pre-198927 . Tive explains that advanced fee 
fraud was a local phenomenon in the 1970's perpetrated by unsophisticated 'guy men' 
that later progressed into sophisticated enterprises with the advent of technology and 
skilled persons which went global in the 1980's28. 
1.3 How globalization factors in 
Globalization is typically viewed as a major culprit facilitating vanous forms of 
transnational organized crime activity and is often believed to be criminogenic due to 
characteristics of the phenomenon that circuitously serve to facilitate and intensify 
incidences of criminal activity across borders. Technological advancements are 
frequently the chief suspect and attributed to both increased efficiency and anonymity in 
which crimes can now be conducted in our globalized era. These advancements are also 
responsible for creating new genres of transnational organized crime: Interpol explains 
that recent advances have allowed for "the emergence of new types of crime as well as 
the commission of traditional crimes by means of new technologies" 29: for example 
organ and body part trafficking which were impossible before the advent of refrigerated 
cargo facilities and other necessary equipment. Or in the case of transnational fraud, the 
internet and online banking services have revolutionized the efficiency and ease of 
processing fraudulent transactions. Population booms and record-setting levels of 
26 Ultras can Advanced Global Investigations, 419 unit AFF statistics and estimates, (no date ) [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ultrascan.nl/htmI/419 _ statistics.html [2006, November 13]. 
27 Interpol, Financial fraud. 
28 Tive, 11. 
29 Interpol: Convention on cyber crime: ExplanatOfY report, (2001) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.interpol.intiPublic/TechnologyCrime/Conferences/6thIntConf/ExplanatoryReport.pdf. [2006, 
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immigration, via increased social disorganization, are often cited as another factor that 
adept transnational criminal organizations eagerly take advantage of, especially human 
trafficking cartels, War, poverty, and unemployment are further mentioned for their 
criminogenic nature, which ranges from creating a pool of vulnerable victims traffickers 
and smugglers are quick to utilize for financial benefits as well as resulting in rampant 
corruption and desperation. Even certain market conditions associated with the 
globalization processes are believed to encourage and provide opportunities for 
transnational criminal groups to successfully conduct their operations. This study will 
center around various Nigerian social, political, and economic conditions which are part 
and parcel of globalization in addition to focusing on the history of the state and how 
these factors have synergistically resulted in an environment ripe for transnational fraud, 
Globalization has numerous definitions but is typically classified as " ... the closer 
integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the 
enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down 
of artificial borders to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser 
extent) people across borders,,3o, Furthermore, globalization is often depicted as an 
intangible term with no consensual or unanimous starting point. Some critics suggest 
globalization is an ancient phenomenon. However, for the purpose of the study, the 
globalization I refer to encompasses the changes in society, economy, and governments 
all over the world that occurred post 1980. Similarly, cross-border organized crime has 
existed prior to 1980 and "such crime has a lineage that scholars have traced back to the 











Chapter 1 An Inquiry into the Causality of Nigerian Organized Crime 
times of pirates on the high seas and the African slave trade,,3l, Nigeria especially has a 
significant history of organized crime activity which many scholars attribute to various 
social disorganization factors, such as the upheaval caused by wars and corruption on an 
implausible scale. Thus international organized crime has existed in various 
manifestations prior to the phenomenon of globalization, But the processes of 
globalization and its implications have had a major impact on the pervasiveness and 
profitability for crime beyond the borders of a single country32, Globalization has moved 
organized crime that was generally confined within the borders of a single state and 
occasionally transnational and catapulted now stateless actors into an unrestrained global 
playing field. It has redefined the very structure of these groups and allowed them to 
evolve from ethic linear clusters into highly capable and powerful networks that easily 
elude law enforcemene3. It has intensified not only the numerical incidences of 
transnational organized crime, but has created new categories of crime ready for 
exploitation,34 including advanced fee fraud. But perhaps most ominously, globalization 
means transnational organized crime's implications are no longer isolated and contained 
within tight geographical boundaries but now constitute affronts to state sovereignty: 
"Global criminal activities are transforming the international system, upending the rules, 
31 Louise Shelley, John Picarelli, and Chris Corpora, "Global Crime Inc", in Maryann Cusimano Love, ed., 
Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda. (Thomson: Wadsworth, 2002), 144. 
32 For example, " ... criminal activities surged and became global in the 1990s". See: Moises Nairn, Illicit: 
How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy, (New York: Random 
House, 2005), 5. 
33 Nairn explains that since the 1990s transnational organized crime groups have undergone " ... a great 
mutation ... All have moved away from fixed hierarchies and toward decentralized networks; away from 
controlling leaders and toward multiple, loosely linked, dispersed agents and cells; away from rigid lines of 
control and exchange and toward constantly shifting transactions as opportunities dictate. See: Ibid, 7. 
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creating new players, and reconfiguring power in international politics and economics,,35. 
Sweeping technological changes, increased migration, and porous borders are just a few 
of the bypro ducts of globalization that have suited the workings of organized crime 
networks and promoted its transnational nature. Louise I. Shelley, Director of 
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University explains: 
Transnational crime will be a defining issue of the 21 st century for policymakers -
as defining as the Cold War was for the 20th century and colonialism was for the 
19th. Terrorists and transnational crime groups will proliferate because these 
crime groups are major beneficiaries of globalization. They take advantage of 
increased travel, trade, rapid money movements, telecommunications and 
computer links, and are well positioned for growth36. 
1.4 Set-up of West African and Nigerian criminal networks 
Globalization has entailed a restructuring of the classical criminal group or organization. 
Historically, groups have had a clearly demarcated and hierarchal order and were often 
established along ethnic lines. In these types of organized crime groups, roles and 
activities were well defined and static and 'leaders,' 'kingpins', and 'heads' were easily 
discernible. Thus, the configurations were referred to as 'cartels,' 'mafias', or 
'syndicates'. However, due particularly to the globalization processes and in response to 
the primacy placed on markets, the structuring has morphed into fluid networks and these 
groups now mimic the structure of legitimate businesses37. The benefits of this 
transformation is two-fold: the networks become better positioned to take advantage of 
the globalized economy in terms of moving into new market niches and exploiting supply 
35 Nairn,S. Furthermore: "Rogue states, terrorist networks, and transnational organized crime enter into 
alliances, creating asymmetric military threats that exploit the globalization of democracy and free market 
capitalism". See: Shelley, Picarelli, and Corpora, 158. 
36 The Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University, Who we are, (2004) [Online]. 
Available: http://www.american.edultraccc/about/whoweare.htmi [2006, November 13]. 
37 The UNODC explains: "The traditional hierarchical forms of organized crime groups have diminished; 
replaced with loose networks who work together in order to exploit new market opportunities". UNODC, 
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and demand in addition to thwarting threats by law-enforcement38 . This is especially true 
for African organized crime groups, which are referred to as criminal enterprises, the 
most notorious of which is the Nigerian Criminal Enterprise. These new labels depict the 
business like configuration in which the networks now prefer to operate39. 
Nigerian Networks involved in the traditional organized crimes are typically small, with a 
core membership of three to five persons, and their mode of operation is often described 
as a master-apprentice configuration. Successful entrepreneurs, referred to as masters, 
recruit apprentices for specific and short-term, often 'one-time' purposes as opposed to 
on a permanent basis. The identity of the entrepreneur, or the instigator of the network, 
remains unknown and irrelevant to the short-term apprentices in the traditional organized 
crimes. This has obvious benefits for the workings of the criminal network and frustrates 
law-enforcement efforts to track down the main players in the network in the event that 
these short-term apprentices are caught. Furthermore, long term specialization is 
believed to be rare, and many entrepreneurs run both licit and illicit enterprises as well as 
maintaining a fluid network that is able to involve itself in different types of organized 
cnme. Diversifying of criminal activity, or being involved in more than one crime 
category, IS believed to be one of the side-effects globalization has had on the 
arrangement of criminal networks4o. In the case of Nigeria, profits from advanced fee 
38 Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Networks", in John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, eds., 
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Rand Corporation: 2002),61-2. 
39 For example, Colombian narcotics trafficking groups" ... have followed standard business practices for 
market and product diversification". And other criminal groups are increasingly employing financial 
specialists to assist in the money laundering process. See: Phil Williams, Organi::ed crime and cyber 
crime: implications for business, (2002) [Online]. Available: http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/cybercrime-
business.pdf [2006, November 13]. 2. 
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fraud are believed to provide funds for involvement III other organized cnmes by 
fraudsters 41. 
The mode of operation for groups involved in transnational fraud through technology is 
similar in initial size and in recruiting technique to the more traditional crimes. However, 
members are thought to be more advanced in that a relatively high standard of education 
is needed as well as a familiarity with computers and other forms of technology in 
addition to technical skills such as document forgery. There are two contemporary 
modes of operation for these groups: an experienced operator with access to the 
necessary resources, mainly the internet, recruits select and adept apprentices or an 
operator first entraps a victim via the internet and then employs apprentices as needed42 . 
The numbers of apprentices can become quite substantial once the scheme is underway 
and the victim is entrapped: 'front-end' men are employed or those who correspond by 
telephone or even face-to-face with victims, in addition to more 'shadow' apprentices 
whose purposes include setting up fraudulent bank accounts and obtaining faux business 
documentation, as well as trusted apprentices who are signatories on the bank accounts 
which are used to collect the advanced fees. Interestingly, the entrepreneur or instigating 
operator, often legitimate businessmen with substantial assets oversees, typically resists 
becoming directly involved but funds the scams as well as launders the resulting profits43 . 
41 Tive, 121. 
42 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 15. 
43 Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations, 419 advancefeefraud, (no date) [Online]. Available: 
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1.5 International implications of advanced fee fraud 
Advanced fee fraud has become yet another example of how criminal groups have 
exploited new technology, namely the internet for their own purposes, and is a classic 
example of the evolution of crime. Other manifestations of cyber-crime beyond fraud 
include money laundering, theft, intellectual property violations, and pedophilia as well 
as various other illicit activities that need only the internet to thrive. With the rise of 
technology and other means of communication, criminal networks have gained a 
considerable degree of sophistication as well as a range of opportunities not available 
before. And the borderless world of the net, specifically because it is riddled with 
jurisdictional voids, provides a certain degree of protection and insulation as well as 
considerable anonymity for organized crime groups to conduct their activities. And 
Africa is no exception to the trend, as can be seen in the unprecedented levels of 
transnational fraud originating from the continent. 
Today Nigerian 419 scams have become rampant and are especially prevalent in 
industrialized nations. In 1998, the United States passed the Nigerian Advance Fee 
Fraud Prevention Act. Section 2.15 of the house bill stated that the Nigerian 
Government's lack of regulation or enforcement of laws prohibiting the practice was 
equivalent to the government playing a significant role of accomplice in the fraud. The 
proposed course of action by the US Government included informing and educating the 
public, coordinating governmental agencies to action, working at the international level 











Chapter 1 An Inquiry into the Causalitv of Nigerian Organized Crime 
possible "imposition of economic and other sanctions on the Government of Nigeria,,44. 
In more recent times, the magnitude ofthe problem has not abated and in 2002 the United 
States Department of Justice acquired a court mandate to open every item of mail 
originating from Nigeria and passing through JFK airport in New York; 70% of which 
was determined to be propositions for advanced fee fraud schemes. Australian Post, 
between August and November of 1998, confiscated 4.5 tons of advance fee 
correspondence which was equivalent to 1.8 million items45 . What is responsible for the 
frequency of advanced fee fraud, whether it has roots in traditional Nigerian organized 
crime or whether it is can be better explained via recent developments, namely 
globalization, are all questions this study will seek to address. 
The next chapter provides an overview of the history of organized crime in West Africa, 
with a specific focus on Nigeria. The chapter seeks to identify causal factors of 
transnational crime in light of the political, economic, and social environment of Nigeria. 
Political instability, corruption, and the oil boom in addition to the facilitory relationship 
between regionalization initiatives and crime that is transnational in nature is highlighted. 
The subsequent chapters deal with other processes that are believed to be relevant to 
transnational fraud including globalization, new technology, and neo-liberal economic 
reforms such as deregulation and privatization. The concluding chapter attempts to 
outline specific factors and illuminate certain processes that have made Nigeria so 
conducive to transnational fraud in particular and transnational organized crime In 
general. 
44 Tive, 153. 
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2: A History of Organized Crime in Nigeria 
The idea that Nigeria has a modus operandi peculiar to transnational fraud, as suggested 
by Charles Tive, is the rationale behind an extensive analysis of Nigerian society. This 
chapter will assess the implications of various socio-economic phenomena, ranging from 
the Nigerian oil boom to more contemporary efforts at regional integration to explain the 
pervasiveness of transnational fraud. Additionally, many factors are thought to be related 
to the current state of organized crime within Nigeria's borders, including the tumultuous 
history of the West African nation in which many Nigerians turned to criminal activity as 
a means of survival. Nigeria's history includes colonialism, followed by ethnic tensions 
soon after the crude demarcation of the country's borders, followed by independence, 
dictatorships, and military COUpS46. The oil boom of the 1970's resulted in Nigeria 
becoming a magnet for immigrants from neighboring countries, some of whom were 
soon expelled from the country47. This was followed by armed conflict in the region 
which allowed organized crime to further flourish48. Globalization and the spread of 
democracy in the region both benefited and resulted in adverse consequences for Nigeria; 
specifically the premature liberalization of the economy and the deregulation of the 
financial industry have recently been tied to increases in transnational organized crime 
within the region49. Currently, a lack of sufficient income-earning opportunities and 
poverty characterize large sectors of the Nigerian population, and these two factors are 
46 Nigeria has undergone six violent changes of government" ... in addition to a 30-month-Iong civil war in 
which an estimated one million people were killed, maimed, or displaced." See: Adebayo Adedeji, Ed. 
Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts (London: Zed Books, 1999), 4. 
47 Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria in 1981 and 1983. See: UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime 
in the West African Region, 6. 
48 ECOWAS peace-keeping troops are believed to have been involved in illicit activity, specifically 
narcotics trafficking. See: Eboe Hutchful, The ECOlvlOG experience with peacekeeping in Africa, (1999) 
[Online]. A vailable: http://www.iss.co.zaJPubs/Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.html[2006. November 13]. 
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ancient and well-established facilitators of crime. Thus, Nigeria's history serves as an 
important backdrop to understanding contemporary forms of transnational organized 
crime within the country as well as the evolution of relatively new, less traditional 
crimes, such as advanced fee fraud. Furthermore, a study of organized crime in Nigeria 
would not be complete without an ample focus on corruption within the state. 
2.1 Nigeria: demographics and trends 
Nigeria is a sizeable country located between Benin and Cameroon, to the West and East 
respectively, and bordering Chad and Niger to the North. To the South, Nigeria's 853km 
of coastline borders the Gulf of Guinea, and situated on the lower south-west corner of 
the coastline is Lagos, the bustling commercial city and former capital of the country. 
Lagos has earned itself a notorious reputation for various transnational organized crime 
activities, and is currently a hub and distribution center for various drugs50 and most 
Nigerian organized crime groups are believed to be centered in this well-connected port 
city. Furthermore, Nigeria's extensive land and sea borders are difficult to monitor and 
remain largely unpatrolled. The centrally located capital and planned city of Abuja is less 
notorious then Lagos in terms of being home to illicit activity and is the fastest growing 
city on the continent. The country has a population of approximately 182 million, the 
largest in Africa, with a median age of 18.7 and a population growth rate of 2.38%. 
AIDS affects 5.4% of the adult population and there is serious risk of other diseases such 
as meningitis, typhoid fever, Lassa fever, and malaria among others resulting in an 
average life-expectancy of 47.08 years. A majority of the population, 68%, are literate. 
50 Direct flights from Lagos to the United States, for example, were believed to be suspended due to 
Lagos' heavy involvement in heroin trafficking. See: lean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice 
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Nigeria has a diverse range of ethnic groups, totaling some 250 different groups, of which 
the Hausa and Fulani (29%), Y oruba (21 %), and Igbo/Ibo (18%) are the largest. 
Furthermore, the majority of the population is Muslim (50%), followed by Christians 
(40%), and there is a sizeable population of indigenous believers (l 0%)51. Economically 
speaking, Nigeria has the second largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa52, and the Ibo 
are the market-dominant clan often referred to as the "Jews of Nigeria" in addition to 
being " ... famous world over for being an unusually driven and enterprising 'trader' 
minority,,53. Similarly the Lebanese in West Africa, along with their access to the global 
marketplace, dominate the profitable import-export businesses throughout West African 
2.2 Domestic facilitators of transnational organized crime 
At first glance, Nigeria does not appear to be drastically different than any other 
developing African country; it is characterized by diverse ethnic groups, a turbulent 
history post-colonialism, civil unrest, and an inadequate standard of living. Logically 
these factors may potentially increase the lucrativeness of criminal activity but it does not 
explain why Nigeria has emerged as one of the most corrupt and criminogenic states in 
the world. The Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress outlines numerous 
conditions that may make a nation-state a breeding ground for transnational organized 
crime activity ranging from terrorism to fraud: 
51 CIA, The worldfactbook-Nigeria, (2006) [Online]. Available: 
https:/ Iwww.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html[2006. November 13]. 
52 SKB Asante. Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, reality and challenges (London: 
MacmiIIan, 1997),30. 
53 Chua attributes the Ibo success in trading various commodities to the fact that" ... they have the contacts, 
know the terrain, and can do it most cheaply." See: Amy Chua. World on Fire (London: Arrow, 2003), 
108-110. 
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The main domestic elements making a nation "hospitable" to transnational crime 
and terrorism are _official corruption, incomplete or weak legislation, poor 
enforcement of existing laws, non-transparent financial institutions, unfavorable 
economic conditions, lack of respect for the rule of law in society, and poorly 
guarded national borders. In some cases, several of those conditions arise together 
from a lack of political will to establish the rule of law, In turn, such a lack can 
derive from weak national institutions or from high-level corruption. A failing 
national economy often is an influential background factor that increases domestic 
and transnational criminal activity in a country. Such purely domestic factors 
often are exacerbated by a nation's geographic location (along a key narcotics 
trafficking route or in a region where arms trafficking is prolific, for example), or 
the influence of regional geopolitical issues such as a long-standing territorial 
dispute5s . 
Interestingly, Nigeria encompasses almost all of these domestic characteristics. Thus the 
following paragraphs will focus on the outlined issues highlighted in the above analysis 
and will specifically focus on their application to Nigeria and their role in Nigerian 
transnational organized crime. 
An ineffective rule of law 
Nigeria is a fairly new state, which only gained independence in 1960 from Great Britain, 
and thus does not have a well-established legal system. It characterizes itself as a federal 
republic whose legal system is based on English common law yet twelve of Nigeria'S 
northern states are subject to Islamic Shariah56. These dual systems have a major effect 
on the equal application of the law and are likely to contribute to a disregard for the rule 
of law. This explanation is somewhat similar to Biko Agozino's post-colonial theory 
which views the implications of imperialism as largely responsible for the contemporary 
state of crime in the West African region and that current crime rates are best explained 
through the adversarial relationships between 'the masses' and the 'neo-colonial 
55 Library of Congress, Nations Hospitable to Organi::ed Crime and Terrorism, 1. 
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regimes', According to Agozino, before the advent of colonialism, West Africa was 
characterized by peaceful and orderly societies whose sophisticated social control 
mechanisms favored restitution and provided just compensation for victims while 
adequately punishing offenders. Only after the imposition of the transatlantic slave trade 
was West African society severely undermined and barbaric violence on unprecedented 
scales introduced by the European Colonial powers. The European powers also brought 
with them a retributive model of social control which replaced the traditional well-
developed restitution-oriented modeL The imposition of this unfamiliar punitive 
ideology is best exemplified in the growth of Nigerian prison facilities which grew 
exponentially with the advent of colonialism. Previously, penitentiaries and prisons were 
alien to the West African region and there were 0 institutions of incarceration in the 
region prior to 1800. By 1990, there were approximately 131 prisons in Nigeria alone, 
including the 83 which were built between 1900 and 1950 during the scramble for 
Africa57 , Thus colonialist legacies have severe implications in the creation of social 
control mechanisms in the Nigerian state. Judging from the criminogenic state of 
Nigeria's contemporary society, these imposed mechanisms have failed to contribute to 
the maintenance of an orderly social structure. In fact, it is widely believed that the 
criminal justice systems throughout the West African region are severely inadequate and 
lacking in resources 58 . 
57 Biko Agozino, "Crime, criminology and post-colonial theory: Criminological reflections on West 
Africa", in James Sheptycki and Ali Wardak, eds., Transnational and Comparative Criminology. (London: 
Glasshouse Press, 2005),117-127. 
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Illicit activity is not a new development and throughout history it has often been used as a 
coping-mechanism when legitimate forms of income making opportunities are 
unavailable or nonexistent. At other times, despite the availability of opportunities, 
potential profits justify in utilitarian terms engagement in illicit activity, This is 
essentially "Neoclassical economics applied to illegal transactions"," where "criminals 
as rational agents [make] economic choices when illegality heightens profit 
opportunities"S9, This is similar to Alan Smart's 'extentionist hypothesis' which 
contends "illegal markets are nothing more than normal markets in which entrepreneurs 
have been enticed by demand to overstep the bounds of the law in search of higher 
profits,,6o. However, most theories of crime which aim to explain participation in illicit 
activity have been developed though a Western lens and appear to be applicable mainly 
in light of industrialized nations with strong capitalist institutions, Criminological 
theories that apply to the rest of the world are scarce; but perhaps a pertinent one would 
be a theory that implicates the state as having a symbiotic relationship with illegal 
practices61 . In terms of legal pluralism, or the coexistence of multiple legal norms or 
systems, on former colonial states, the various legal systems may permit some to derive 
benefit from the new rules or procedures62. Furthermore, peripheral regions may give 
rise to 'military entrepreneurs' while "inside effective states, however, such rival political 
domains are quashed,,63. Thus, the role of the Nigerian state and its relationship with 
59 Josiah McC.Heyman, Ed. States and Illegal Practices. (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 4. 
60 Ibid, 4. 
61 McC.Heyman explains that state law and the evasion of state law go hand in hand; "certainly the state 
does not always conspire with crime, but it is intriguing to inquire after the conditions under which 
governments and illegal practices enjoy some variety of symbiosis ... " Ibid, 1. 
62 Ibid, 6. 
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transnational organized crime activity is of paramount importance, especially the nature 
of state corruption. 
Corruption and the state as a criminal agent 
In terms of corruption, Nigeria is often viewed as the archetypal kleptocracy. 
Transparency International, in their latest annual Corruptions Perceptions Index, ranks 
Nigeria as the third most corrupt country in their survey with an abysmal score indicating 
rampant corruption64 , This corruption is likely facilitated by Nigeria's weak institutions 
which are approached as prizes to be won as opposed to legitimate social contracts that 
must be upheld. Kleptocracies often become sanctuaries for organized crime groups 
especially when these states are coupled with lax regulations of their financial systems 
and other weak economic laws. Abacha was the classic leader of a kleptocratic state and 
looted the economic revenue of Nigeria in addition to demanding outrageous kickbacks 
for legitimate and illegitimate businesses to operate65 . And like many other African 
nation-states, Nigeria is a patrimonial state which can lead to complicity between elites 
and criminals, as is thought to be the case with the narcotics trade: Nigeria's political elite 
are very much involved in criminal activity, specifically as being shadow agents for the 
illicit drug trade. This involvement is typically in the form of a levy or tax on narcotics 
that pass through Nigeria as well as additional charges on the traffickers that are 
subsequently pocketed by government officials. The process is somewhat similar to how 
Nigerian elite loot oil revenue, though drug profits only form a small part of personal 
64 Transparency International, Global corruption report, (2006) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download _gcr [2006, November 13]. 
65 Federation of American Scientists, International crime threat assessment, (2000) [Online]. Available: 
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revenue accumulation for the elite, But profits are substantial enough that critics believe 
" ... a large part of the Nigerian economy and of Nigerian society is irrigated by the profits 
of the drug trade, in a similar way to what has happened in Colombia,,66, Corruption, 
then, seems to stem from the availability of opportunities, whether it is in the form of oil 
revenue that can be robbed from the national coffers to implicit deals with transnational 
organized crime groups that can produce a steady stream of personal revenue. 
Chinua Achebe subscribes to a similar idea and explains that rather than being inherently 
corrupt, "Nigerians are corrupt because the system under which they live today makes 
corruption easy and profitable; they will cease to be corrupt when corruption is made 
difficult and inconvenient,,67, Today, Nigeria produces 2.45 million barrels of oil a day68. 
This production is regulated by weak institutions and multi-national corporations who are 
not answerable to the people. Furthermore, revenues are entrusted to kleptocratic 
government officials who have both a reputation and history of unscrupulous behavior: 
General Ibrahim Babangida, former Nigerian military dictator for example, is believed to 
have amassed a fortune in excess $30 billion a la petrodollars allowing him to join the 
ranks of the richest people in the world. Similarly, his successor General Sani Abacha is 
believed to have stolen $4 billion within the first five years of rule69. Maurice Ibekwe, a 
former Federal Nigerian House of Representatives member, was charged with 
involvement in advanced fee scams but died in custody before he could be prosecuted. 
Ibekwe, in collusion with candidates for the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) and 
66 Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 29. 
67 Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co, Ltd, 1983),48. 
68 CIA, The worldfactbook-Nigeria. 
69 Godfrey Mwakikagile, Africa is in a Mess: What Went Wrong and What Should be Done (Fultus: 
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Emmanuel Nwude, a prominent PDP supporter, deceived a well-connected Brazilian 
banker into transferring close to a quarter of a billion dollars for the fictitious 
construction of an airport in Abuja. This was the largest 419 case ever reported and 
Nwude, the instigator, remarkably to this day is still a major share-holder of Union Bank, 
which is ranked among the largest financial institutions in Nigeria70 , When Nigeria's 
leaders overtly loot, steal and generate income by clearly illegitimate means, their actions 
suggest to the rest of the population who are struggling to survive that wealth can be 
accumulated by any means necessary. Thus, social control mechanisms such as 
discouraging deviance and ensuring a collective conscience are destroyed when top-
ranking government officials are blatant examples of criminal agents. 
Corruption, defined as ", .. the combination of positions of public office with positions of 
accumulation ... was always a feature of the mercantilist trade system which was at its 
zenith in Africa from 1930 to 1980." Kleptocracies, then, are not peculiar to Africa but 
defined various governments at different points in their history around the world, many of 
whom plundered the state at shocking rates reaching "Mobutu-esque proportions" 71. The 
mercantilist system's introduction to Africa, including its obsession with accumulation 
and disregard for the common good, consequently resulted in the formation of various 
kelptocracies throughout the continent, including Nigeria. Corruption has taken its toll 
on Nigeria and Godfrey Mwakikagile laments the fate of the state which post 
independence was viewed as Africa's great hope due to its immeasurable resources and 
skilled manpower that if developed could easily rival middle power countries such as 
70 UNODC, Transnational Organi::ed Crime in the West African Region, 26. 
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Italy and Canada. There were even rumors during that time that Nigeria had the 
competence to build an atomic bomb in the coming decades. However, all the optimism 
and potential of the state was squandered repeatedly by military dictators who pocketed 
petrodollars on an incomprehensible scale, adding Nigeria to the list of defunct and 
corrupt African countries 72. 
Alan Smart identifies five basic explanations for the persistence of illegal economic 
activity in nation states and explains that situations typically have more than one case at 
play: the first case, market persistence is based on the fundamental idea of supply and 
demand. In these cases, incentives for illegal activity are greater than the states capacity 
to control the market. In the second case, ambiguous persistence, typically small-scale 
illegal activity is tolerated or laxly policed even though it may cause a loss of significant 
revenue for the state. An example of this would be the informal economies in 
postcolonial regions of West Africa. The third case, managed persistence, is when the 
state derives substantial benefit from illegal activity and makes token efforts to regulate. 
According to Smart "It has also been suggested that in a variety of states, bureaucracies 
profit from the proliferation of costly regulations in order to extract bribes from economic 
agents." This is most likely the case in Nigeria where government officials are involved 
in various illicit activities, especially narcotics and fraud, and bribery is often viewed as a 
standard business practice. The fourth case, rebellious persistence, is characterized by 
internal political actors such as guerrilla groups who guard illicit practices regardless of 
opposition from the state. Typically, the state structure is constituted of open spaces with 
somewhat autonomous actors who allow illegal practices due to collected revenue. This 
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is how the Medellin cocaine cartel functioned in Colombia. And lastly, subversive 
persistence whereby foreign actors support illicit practices in order to undermine the state 
and generated revenues and other benefits go to the governments of the other state73 • 
Nigeria appears to primarily suffer from managed persistence, where the state in 
collusion with criminal networks generates substantial personal revenue. 
Territorial disputes 
In terms of territorial disputes, another factor thought to make a country hospitable to 
transnational organized crime, Nigeria is no stranger to disputed land. The country has a 
diverse array of ethnicities totaling some 250 groups and Nigerians are notoriously 
unpatriotic and divided74, thus disputes over land are inevitable. One such dispute 
resulted in a civil war, from 1967 to 1970, when a region in southeastern Nigeria broke 
away in order to assert its independence as the Republic of Biafra75 . Other territorial 
disputes are economically motivated and control over resource-rich regions are hotly 
contested. In the late 1990s, Nigeria and Cameroon's dispute of the oil-rich Bakassi 
peninsula was heard at the International Court of Justice and is yet to be completely 
resolved76. Early this year, 4000 Nigerians were displaced as a dispute broke out over 
which ethnic group had the right to remove sand in a riverbed in Namu, a small town 
located in Southern Nigeria77 . Today the Niger Delta serves as a source of immense 
violence and conflict, where local armed gangs are outraged at the presence of foreign oil 
73 McC.Heyman, 103-105. 
74 Achebe, 17. 
75 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 2. 
76 CIA, The world factbook-disputes-international, (2006) [Online]. Available: 
https:/ /www.cia.gov/cialpublications/factbookifields/2070.html [2006, November 13]. 
77 BBCnews, Sand row sparks Nigeria clashes, (2006) [Online]. Available: 
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companies and the bleakness of their own economlC futures, and are consequently 
fighting over control of oil resources. 
Domestic trafficking routes and transit points 
Nigeria is also home to various major trafficking routes and serves as a transit country for 
guns, drugs, and humans-beings, which is believed to be another factor which aggravates 
the prevalence of transnational organized crime in a country. In terms of drug trafficking 
on the continent, "Nigeria is the country most directly implicated in the narcotics trade as 
a whole, and is the country south of the Sahara regarded by American law enforcement 
agencies with the most concem,,78. Drug trafficking routes predominately in heroine and 
cocaine from Asia and Latin America respectively transit through Nigeria and on to their 
destined European and American markets. Trafficking routes in human beings originate 
in Nigeria and are destined for the Middle East, Europe, and North America. This trade 
is often facilitated by Nigerian madams, themselves former prostitutes, who recruit girls 
typically from the Edo state as well as various other regions in West Africa and send 
them to work in the sex business oversees. Furthermore, firearms trafficking, initiated in 
Ghana, passes through various neighboring countries and inevitably into the hands of 
Nigerian criminals via the market in Onitsha, the largest market of its kind in the region. 
In addition to the involvement of small arms in localized routine criminal activity, these 
arms imports are believed to be utilized in the Niger Delta region where severe conflict 
rages for control over oil fields and potential oil bunkering ture9. 
78 Sayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 9. 
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2.3 Nigerian syndicates, traditional transnational ethnic-networks, and the Ibos of 
Nigeria 
Nigerian trafficking networks are believed to be the most eminent in the region and the 
lbos of Nigeria are a particularly successful group in both the licit and illicit economies 
throughout West Africa. According to experts, "The comparative advantage of African 
drug traffickers, in a market of literally cut-throat competitiveness, stems from their 
membership of segmentary, decentralized and flexible communities, endowed with a high 
reputation for commercial expertise developed over generations"so. This most closely 
characterizes the lbos of Nigeria who are thought to exert primary control over the most 
prominent West African drug networks responsible for supplying heroin to industrialized 
nations including the United StatesS1 • The Nigerian Syndicates, such as the lbo, are 
believed to have been successful drug traffickers for various reasons including 
sophisticated systems of disguising illegal goods, the ability to mass-recruit individual 
mules, some of whom carry inside their bodies close to $2 million worth of heroin, in 
addition to the linguistic advantages of various Nigerian dialects, making the groups 
impregnable to outside law enforcement agencies. The Nigerian networks are also 
configured in such a way that they are able to engage with the major South-East Asian 
and Latin American criminal organizations, allowing them to directly distribute both 
heroine and cocaine to the American and European marketss2 . Furthermore, the lbos are 
thought to dominate transnational advanced fee fraud scamsS3 . The Lebanese, like the 
lbos, dominate various markets throughout West Africa though they account for only a 
80 Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 11. 
81 The Ibos are" ... said to control up to 70 or 80 per cent of Buremese heroin reaching the American market 
and up to 35 or 40 per cent of heroin of all origin going to the United States." See: Ibid, 9. 
82 Ibid, 10-11. 
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tiny percentage of the overall population. In Sierra Leone, where this influence is 
glaringly evident, the Lebanese controlled the most lucrative sectors of the economy 
including gold, diamonds, retail, finance, real estate, and construction prior to Charles 
Taylor's war and today still exert considerable influence over various sectors84 . In 
Nigeria the Lebanese playa less prominent, though considerably significant role, 
Nigerian society IS also characterized by common resentment to the Ibos. Achebe 
humorously explains that "Nigerians of all other ethnic groups will probably achieve 
consensus on no other matter than their common resentment of the Igb085 ,', This 
resentment, which he calls 'Igbo-trouble', is derived from the groups' success at all levels 
of Nigerian society, especially in terms of economic dominance. Because the Ibos were 
amenable and adaptive to change more so than the other Nigerian ethnic groups, in 
addition to prizing traits such as individualism and appreciating competitiveness, they 
advanced86. This advancement is exemplified in the form of dominance in various 
sectors of the economy including auto parts, shoes, textiles, long distance transportation, 
as well as the Ibos being strong contenders in various other enterprises so much so that 
" ... there is virtually no commercial sector in Nigeria without a strong Ibo contingent,,87. 
Both the Ibos and the Lebanese depict the significance of transnational ethnic networks 
on organized crime activity that crosses borders. These networks utilize the same skills 
that contributed to their success in the formal economy and apply their expertise to the 
84 Ibid, 116. 
85 Achebe, 56. 
86 Ibid, 58. 
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infonnal economy. Their extensive networks and familiarity with international travel and 
trade allows them to fulfill the demand for various goods and services in the immediate 
West African region and beyond. According to the Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress: 
Transnational ethnic networks are a natural outgrowth of artificial, colonial-era 
borders that divide ethnic groups in virtually all African countries. Local 
populations move back and forth freely across such borders. The resulting 
transnational networks readily transport stolen or illicit goods. Foreign 
communities resident in a given country also may fonn networks that often 
control legal commerce, but they may also protect well-established trafficking 
networks that channel illegal commodities between the host country in Africa and 
the home country abroad. Such networks exist among Chinese, Indian, Nigerian, 
and Russian communities in southern Africa and among Indian and Middle 
Eastern groups in East and West Africa. Such networks have come to characterize 
religious communities that may be ethnically based or trans-ethnic in 
composition, such as Muslims in coastal East Africa and in large parts of West 
Africa88 . 
Smuggling and prohibited trans-border trade in assorted commodities particularly 
flourished during colonial rule where imperial powers would place severe restrictions on 
imports from neighboring rival colonies. The borders proved too vast to patrol for the 
colonialists and African networks efficiently traded cash-crops, liquor, tobacco, 
petroleum lamps, and electronics among other sought after goods across various 
boundary lines. Nigeria, for instance, conducted a particularly flourishing trade with 
Benin where guns, gunpowder, and bicycles were exchanged for alcohol, tobacco, and 
cloth. After colonialism, weak African states were unable to adequately provide goods 
and services for their citizens causing the citizemy to increasingly rely on the infonnal 
economies of the trans-state networks for survival. These networks provided essential 
goods such as fuel and food and allowed fanners and other workers to purchase the tools 
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needed to adequately conduct their trade. Today these networks prosper more so than 
traditional social associations because they are experienced in manipulating borders and 
are well positioned to exploit the processes of globalization and regionalism. 
Unfortunately, these networks which were once seen as enriching and aiding the common 
African's survival are now increasingly driven by greed and profit, contributing to 
violence and insecurity in the region89. 
2.4 Other factors thought to contribute to crime: poverty and unemployment 
Nigeria has an unemployment rate of 2.9% and 60% of the population lives below the 
poverty line9o • This is an interesting statistic because it shows in spite of Nigeria's almost 
full employment status, an overwhelming majority of its population lives below the 
poverty line thus revealing the inadequate nature of available work in Nigeria. Because a 
majority of the working population do not earn enough to maintain a tolerable standard of 
living, it is more likely that they will tum to other means to supplement their income. 
These means can include various forms of criminal activity, ranging from unsophisticated 
local advanced fee fraud scams to recruitment in large scale transnational criminal 
enterprises. An equally disturbing statistic estimates that 70% of Nigeria's recent 
university graduates are unemployed or in 'quasi-employment status', which barely 
covers the cost of everyday subsistence91 • And it is this group of educated computer-
savvy youth, lacking legitimate income making options and career opportunities, who are 
typically attracted to the lucrative transnational fraud businesses. 
89 Bach, 22-29. 
90 CIA, The worldfactbook-Nigeria. 
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On the law enforcement end, low wages for Nigerian police officers and other civil 
servants often ensures that police and bureaucratic agents can easily be bribed by 419 
scammers and some may even go as far as collaborating with the schemes. In this sense 
corruption becomes an essential tool for survival. Interestingly, the 419 fraudsters are 
more technologically sophisticated than the average Nigerian policeman who lacks even 
the fundamental equipment to conduct everyday operations. Further hindrances to 
investigating fraudulent claims is that the average Nigerian police officer lacks training in 
basic computer skills and the more advanced forensic accounting techniques that could 
uncover suspected white collar criminal activity. Thus, the police are repeatedly 
outwitted and outsmarted by the fraudsters and prosecution and punishment is rare, if not 
a nonexistent threat92. These factors, especially minimal risk of punishment, all serve to 
encourage the occurrence of various crimes within Nigeria's borders. 
2.5 Other factors thought to contribute to crime: The effects of regionalization on 
West Africa 
According to a UNODC interview with a Sierra Leonean police officer, organized crime 
in Sierra Leone is attached to the establishment of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOW AS) in 1975 which resulted in large population influxes at 
unprecedented levels and allowed Nigerians to initiate early organized crime activity in 
the country93. This depicts an interesting parallel between regionalism initiatives in 
Africa and transnational organized crime. Recently much focus has been accorded to 
regionalization and advocates of regional integration efforts often subscribe to the view 
92 Tive, 125-126. 
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that the future of the sole nation-state is a bleak one and rather the uniting of states into 
formidable blocs, like ECOW AS, is the best way to remain viable in the international 
political economy. Because regional integration is a facilitator of trans-state networks, a 
negative implication of this fact is that integration unintentionally gives rise to an 
informal economy which benefits organized crime groups. Trans-state networks prosper 
with regional integration because the processes often entail a blurring of borders and a 
loss of sovereignty, allowing for new opportunities and terrain to be exploited. 
Transnational organized crime groups, who deal in various commodities in Africa 
ranging from humans to arms, are a prime example of trans-state networks. Thus an 
inadvertent effect of increased regional cooperation and regionalization among weak 
economic states is the promotion of cross-border crime. This is perhaps most evident in 
West Africa, which has a history of efficient trans-state network trade and the region has 
served as a playground for multiple attempts at regionalization with each attempt being 
more ambitious than the last. Daniel Bach refers to this as 'regionalism as a quest' where 
objectives are broad and include integration at multiple levels and expanding mandates, 
. f h h '1' 94 rangmg rom t e economy to t e ml Itary . Bach explains "Trade networks have 
developed in conjunction with transactions on basic products, such as petroleum, staple 
food and cash crops, as well as more sophisticated or high value-added goods, such as 
arms, hi-fi equipment, medicine, diamonds, ivory, and drugs,,95. These trans-state 
networks" ... thrive from the capacity to take advantage of opportunities created by the 
porosity of frontiers, weak state territorial control and the spread of insecurity and 
94 Bach, 23-24. 
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violence, which are powerfully enhanced by the converSIOn of corporate and public 
functions into private sources of gain by those in control...,,96. Thus, just as regional 
integration increases legal and licit cooperation between countries, namely in the form of 
trade liberalization, it also facilitates the trade in illicit goods and illegal services. 
Nigerian hegemony within its region and in regional arrangements such as ECOWAS is a 
well known phenomenon. Interestingly, just as Nigeria is a leader economically in West 
Africa it has also become a leader and a pioneer in the various illicit trades both in its 
region and beyond. This is likely due in part to the ancient traditional trade routes 
established by various Nigerian ethnic groups such as the lbo, Y oruba, and Hausa trading 
networks and their application within today's interconnected world. Marchand explains: 
The combined post-cold war era/post-US hegemony has changed the structure of 
world order from a single, clear and quite transparent bipolar system to a set of 
intricate multipolar networks of strategic alliances-entailing a revolution in 
military affairs?--and highly flexible markets. Added to these factors we have the 
informal/formal nexuses in terms of regionalisms with myriad actors, along with a 
set of new security issues which defy easy containment, such as drugs, gangs, 
guns, migration, etc97 . 
Furthermore, the informal economy created by these myriad actors becomes a powerful 
entity: "the second economy or the informal economy of the border is not populated by 
completely powerless social groups and individuals with little or no control over their 
daily lives,,98 but lively and enterprising traders who will take advantage of opportunities 
presented by various regional arrangements. These trans-state networks are quick to step 
in and fill niches that the state is unable to adequately provide, which serves to increase 
96 Ibid, 26. 
97 Marianne H. Marchand, Morten Boas and Timothy Shaw "The Political Economy of New regionalisms" 
Third World Quarterly, 20, 5 (1999): 905. 
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the importance and power of these networks. On an interesting side note, in terms of 
trade within the African continent, South Africa and Nigeria experienced substantial 
increases in trade between the two nations immediately following the fall of the apartheid 
regime99. Interestingly, these two nations are believed to have the largest illicit 
economies in Africa which are likely facilitated by the increased trade between the two 
states, thus having major implications for rates of trafficking and smuggling throughout 
the continent. 
2.6 Early transnational forms of organized crime 
While sophisticated networks of long-distance commerce have a well-established history 
in the West African region as discussed earlier, only in the 1970s did scores of West 
Africans tum to criminal activity for its income earning potential and it is widely believed 
that many of Africa' subsequent elite gained their wealth through illicit activity. 
According to the UNODC: 
Organized crime in West Africa in its contemporary form is generally perceived 
to have emerged in the 1970s, contemporaneous with the oil price rises of that 
decade, the delinking of the dollar from gold, high inflation, and the rapid spread 
of debt in the developing world1oo. 
In the case of Nigeria, over-invoicing and falsifying official documentation in order to 
transfer funds outside of the state can be traced pre 1975. Major Asian, Lebanese, and 
European companies and banks based throughout West Africa were accomplices to 
foreign exchange fraud and false accounting which facilitated Nigeria's elite to move 
99 Robert Davies, "South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Current Patterns and Future 
Perspectives", in Adebayo Adedeji, ed., South Africa and Africa: within or apart? (London: Zed Books 
1996),167. 
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mass sums of money out of the country. The money is generally believed to have been 
generated by oil revenues which skyrocketed during the oil price hikes of the 1970' s. 
Additionally, the smuggling of crude oil in ships, termed "bunkering", appears to be a 
uniquely Nigerian crime and is believed to generate up to 35% of Nigeria's oil exports 
and account for billions of dollars of illegitimately gained wealth. In terms of other 
organized crimes in Nigeria, the 1980s recorded the first instance of heroin trafficking, 
the widespread prevalence of transnational advanced fee fraud, as well as initial cases of 
human trafficking for the purposes of prostitution. Currently, Nigeria is home to various 
trafficking routes, including trafficking in humans to various countries in the Middle 
East, North America, and Europe; narcotics trafficking to Southern Africa, North 
America, and Europe; as well as housing various heroin and cocaine transit routes which 
originate in Asia and Latin America and are destined for the Northern markets. 
Interestingly, Nigeria is believed to have pioneered drug trafficking in the West African 
region by expanding its operations to neighboring countries. Nigeria is also one of 
largest importers of light weapons, which serve to fuel regional conflict. Additionally, 
high rates of money laundering and various types of fraud are rampant throughout the 
Nigerian state todaylOl. 
2.7 Early origins of advanced fee fraud 
Advance-fee fraud is an especially durable con. In an early variation, the Spanish 
Prisoner Letter which dates to the sixteenth century, scammers wrote to English gentry 
and pleaded for help in freeing a fictitious wealthy countryman who was imprisoned in 
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Spain102 . Its Nigerian variation differs but is based on the same principles of deception in 
order to gain monetarily and its origins can be traced back to the oil boom. While most 
countries suffered extensively from the problems posed by the oil price hikes in 1973 and 
1979, Nigeria, the sole oil producer at that time in the West African region, received 
unprecedented revenues103 much of which was subsequently pocketed and deposited into 
the bank accounts of government officials. Specific incidents of organized crime in 
Nigeria during this period in the 1970s generally entailed bureaucratic forms of crime 
including falsifying imports by way of over-invoicing or importing shoddy goods for 
government departments in association with government officials, with whom the profits 
were then shared. It is often believed that these activities were precursors to 
contemporary forms of transnational fraud, especially the advanced fee fraud scams that 
are today characteristic ofNigeria104. 
According to various accounts from a former Nigerian police officer, there are two 
groups of fraudsters or con artists in Nigeria: local con men and International '419ners'. 
The former predate the transnational scams and focused on scamming locals through 
various means such as the black money scam to curious hypnotism and superstition 
schemes. These crude con men, locally referred to as 'guy men', eventually widened 
their scope and evolved into more sophisticated fraudsters or "OBT men", their name 
derived from the passage in section 419 of the Nigerian criminal code which prohibits the 
act of obtaining goods or money through false pretenses. OBT men emerging in the late 
1970s used technology, typically the letterpress and typewriters, to create fraudulent 
102 Zuckoff. 
103 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West Aji-ican Region, 3, 
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invoices and receipts among other necessary documents. Inflation in the mid-1980s, 
commonly associated with implementation of International Monetary Fund (lMF) 
regulations around 1985 followed by a $450 million loan from the World Bank in 1989, 
caused unemployment and other social problems and the local OBT scams began to draw 
skilled and educated youth, who lacked legitimate income making opportunities 
elsewhere. These youth, sensing the worthless value of the Nigerian Naira and facilitated 
by reductions in foreign exchange control shifted from local scams to ones targeting 
stronger foreign currencies, giving birth to what is today referred to globally as the 4] 9 
scam. Thus the International 419ners are a more recent and more sophisticated 
phenomenon focused primarily on defrauding victims in the industrialized nations. Local 
con artists, still present today, may eventually become International 419ners if they are 
able to fund the equipment necessary, namely computers and internet lines, to conduct 
their activities transnationally105, The evolution of advanced fee fraud in Nigeria then, is 
closely associated with the economic circumstances surrounding the state, which will be 
the main focus of the subsequent chapters. 
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3: Globalization and the Impact of Technology and Neo-Liberalism 
As shown in the previous chapter, much of Nigeria's organized crime has been the result 
of lagging economic opportunities which forced people into illegitimate activities. This 
is especially true in the case of advanced fee fraud. But many states go through tough 
economic times and do not emerge as leaders in organized crime activity, let alone 
generate new genres of crime as Nigeria has done with 419 scams. Thus, Nigeria 
presents a unique case which can be explained in part through the implications of 
globalization, namely the impact of technology and neo-liberal economic policies since 
the 1980s which actually coincides with the beginning of Nigeria's intense involvement 
in transnational forms of organized crime. Globalization's implications presents 
numerous opportunities for organized crime groups to exploit and allows established 
criminal groups and relatively new enterprises, such as the African criminal networks, to 
expand the scope of their activities as well as liaise with competing cartels, resulting in a 
menacing network of illicit activity. The rise of technology further allows complex 
criminal transactions to be conducted with ease, efficiency, and relative anonymity. 
When globalization is coupled with an already unstable and corrupt social structure, like 
that of Nigeria's, the appeal and opportunities for transnational organized crime within 
that globalized and socially disorganized territory and beyond become unprecedented. 
3.1 Globalization and Africa 
Proponents of unfettered globalization often ascribe Africa's economic woes to the lack 
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"the peripheral regions of the world-such as Africa-far from remaining untouched by 
these forces, are powerfully affected, but not necessarily towards positive change" 
106. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in regards to the 
World Trade Organization's (WTO) development agenda and agreements from 1995-
2005, or the first decade of the WTO's existence, the 49 least developed countries were 
estimated to be worse off $600 million each year, while Sub-Saharan Africa would be 
worse off by $1.2 billion each yearl07. Therefore, as globalization has given rise to 
unprecedented prosperity in certain parts of the world, it has concurrently spawned 
unprecedented poverty and inequality which is associated with what is commonly 
referred to as 'a dark side'. This dark side includes the various illicit activities that have 
experienced surges in recent times: human trafficking, transnational fraud, drug 
trafficking, organ trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling, and terrorism are all 
among the transnational organized crimes that have flourished globally and whose impact 
is far more recognized in recent years. The prevalence of transnational organized crime 
on the agenda's of various governments around the world beginning in the 1990s can be 
attributed to the alleged threats ethnic based groups posed to security and economic 
configurations in these countries 108. Africa is no exception to the mounting trend and in 
addition to the traditional transnational crimes, the continent also suffers from high levels 
of smuggling of stolen cars, endangered species, precious minerals, as well as widespread 
corruption. The allure of these illicit activities has been driven by both increasing profits 
106 Richard Jackson, "Violent internal conflicts and the African state: Towards a framework of analysis" 
Journal ojContemporary African Studies, 20, 1 (2002): 46. 
107 E.J. Kelsey, "Reclaiming the future: Some reflections post-September 11", in CW Du Toit, and GJA 
Lubbe, eds., After September 11; Globalisation, War and Peace. (Pretoria: UNISA, 2002): 12. 
108 Adam Edwards, "Transnational organized crime", in James Sheptycki and Ali Wardak, eds., 
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to be made and facilitated by sweeping technological innovations which have resulted in 
the flattening of the world 
Many contend the role of globalization in the transnational organized crime phenomena. 
It is true that crime transcending borders is by no means a new occurrence, but today 
globalization in association with local social conditions, is seen as the primary driving 
force behind various transnational organized crimes. Globalization, characterized by 
rising cultural exchange and international trade as well as free market economics and 
democratization, is seen by many as a desirable end product of a truly modernized society 
and the terms globalization and modernization are often used interchangeably. However, 
when examined closely, certain aspects of globalization and modernization can be 
criminogenic and directly responsible for various transnational organized crime 
phenomena, especially advanced fee fraud. The UNODC refers to this as the 
unintentional implications and side-effects of globalization where widespread economic 
and technological advancement has resulted in "unprecedented openings for illegitimate 
activities by criminal groups and enterprises" 1 09. Among these are a range of 
opportunities for criminal networks varying from the gruesome practice of buying and 
selling organs to more white-collar oriented crime, such as advanced fee fraud. 
According to Nairn, illicit networks have undergone massive transformations since the 
1990s due mainly to four major advancements associated with the globalization 
processes. The first advancement affects the method of operation for criminal enterprises 
and includes the ability to source, formulate, and assemble products and services in any 
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comer of the world. In the case of transnational fraud, this advancement goes beyond 
logistics and includes the ability for organized crime groups to shop around for favorable 
jurisdictions as well as financial institutions willing to support their questionable 
transactions, many of which will be located in developing countries. Secondly, 
traditional safe houses and meeting spots have been replaced by 'virtual warehouses' and 
internet chatrooms, allowing groups to communicate with unprecedented ease and 
anonymity via the world wide web. Third, advancements in the illicit financial markets 
allow numerous options for the storage of significant sums of cash in addition to the 
availability of countless financers willing to coalesce and reap the profits of various 
organized crime activities. And finally, the dismantling of the pyramidal structure of 
organized crime into multiple self-sustaining cells serves to impede law enforcement 
efforts to target heads in order to inhibit incidences of illicit activity I 10. Overall, 
globalization has provided tangible opportunities and new methods of operation for the 
various forms of transnational organized crime. 
The advent of globalization on Africa's shores has brought with it not only legitimate 
multinational corporations but illegitimate criminal enterprises. Because Africa has 
failed to find a mutually beneficial niche in the global economy, many African states are 
characterized by shaky political regimes that are susceptible to involvement in illicit 
activities. These illicit activities, through unofficial avenues such as bribery and 
corruption, provide revenue to a state that is unable to function adequately in the global 
economy. This is not to imply that the move to illicit activities by government officials is 
an altruistic one, motivated by establishing the common welfare or good. In fact, 
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Mwakikagile distinguishes between productive corruption and malignant corruption; 
Africa suffers from the latter while the more successful Asian economies subscribe to the 
former. Corrupt Asian officials typically use a portion of their illicitly generated funds 
towards funding social welfare programs and infrastructure building thus investing in 
their own countries. African officials, on the other hand, are solely concerned with 
personal accumulation and typically move substantial amounts of money oversees 
ignoring the pressing social needs of their citizenry Ill. States as corrupt actors coalescing 
with criminal networks is in line with Margaret Levi's theory of predatory rule where "In 
predatory states ... coherence is restricted to a small presidential clique, Beyond this, 
market relations dominate administrative behavior so that 'everything is for sale ... And in 
this traffic, holding any slice of public power constitutes a veritable exchange 
instrument" I 12. A detrimental repercussion of globalization then, on weak states is that 
these states are left with few options and a bleak future and may potentially coalesce with 
powerful organized crime groups and may perhaps even become agents for criminal 
activity. As Levi, explained: 
When others control resources that the ruler needs, their bargaining power 
increases, and deals and contracts may be made with these groups. This can lead 
to tacit tolerance of wealthy criminal entrepreneurs in illegal arms or drug trades 
who support election campaigns or guerilla-suppression efforts I 13, 
Criminal activities are believed to blossom as "the world system is subject to a 
simultaneous process of globalization and loss of precise territorial definition, which may 
not lead to the eclipse of the state as an organ of power, but which is most surely leading 
111 Mwakikagile, 74. 
112 McC.Heyman, 102. 
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to the development of transnational relations between societies 114". These transnational 
relations are particularly beneficial to criminal enterprises which quickly liaise with 
relevant actors including government elite, diversify their transactions and commodities, 
and move into market niches as they become available. 
Interestingly, Edwin Sutherland's theory of differential association coined in the late 
1940s provides an explanation of white collar crime and organized crime and is 
especially relevant in light of globalization. In a nutshell, Sutherland contends that crime 
is a learned behavior and individuals learn definitions of the law and legal codes as 
favorable or unfavorable to their individual selves. Crime occurs when a person has an 
excess of favorable law-breaking definitions in relation to definitions for unfavorable 
law-breaking, or what is referred to as differential association. Organized crime, such as 
transnational fraud, is learned by association with others who are involved in these 
activities. These learned criminal associations are reflective of the cultural values that 
characterize the societies these groups originate from, especially in the case of free 
market societies which typically exert massive pressures for competitiveness which often 
manifests itself in illicit activities such as bypassing regulations and corruptionl15. 
Globalization which entails the expansion of free markets and their imposition on 
developing countries also entails an expansion of competitive pressures and new cultural 
values of monetary accumulation to virgin populations. In this sense, globalization 
serves to spread the temptation and allure of criminal activity which subsequently 
manifests itself in socially adapted localized ways, such as advanced fee fraud in Nigeria. 
ll~ Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 9. 
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3.2 What has globalization meant for transnational organized crime groups? 
As discussed in the initial chapter, globalization has entailed a restructuring of the 
classical organized crime group from a traditional hierarchy into more adaptable and 
decentralized networks. Thus the classic view of transnational organized crime as an 
external threat perpetrated by ethnically arranged 'others' as opposed to broad categories 
of activities appears contradictory in light of contemporary global processes and 
implications. Globalization entails a restructuring of these groups and they are no longer 
isolated within their ethnic hierarchies but have evolved into fluid networks at interplay 
with each other. While many groups, such as the Nigerian Criminal Enterprises, are 
ethnically based they are not bound by these ethnic ties but often fraternize with other 
groups inevitably multiplying the skill and resource bases of these criminal networks I 16. 
Consider for example that the Nigerian groups are ranked among the most active heroin 
traffickers, though Nigeria does not produce any heroin of its own 117 thus the 
opportunities presented by globalization for various transnational organized crime groups 
far outweigh traditional notions of comparative advantage. Furthermore, transnational 
organized crime groups are not confined to a shady parallel marketplace but rather 
account for a significant sector of the legitimate economy through grey markets which 
form a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate products and services1l8 . They are able to 
do this more so than ever because many organized crime groups now utilize legitimately 
trained professionals who provide cutting-edge expertise and marketing advice to these 
groups. Financial experts who help groups to map out money laundering techniques, 
116 "Rather than treat each other as rivals, many criminal organizations are sharing information, services, 
resources, and market access according to the principle of comparative advantage". See: The Federation of 
American Scientists. 
117 Ibid. 
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establish front companies, and manage investments among other necessary services are 
also commonly used. Other professionals, such as lawyers and transportation specialists 
are also employed which greatly enhances the overall efficiency ofthese organizationsl19 . 
Beyond these structural reconfigurations, globalization processes have created vast new 
frontiers of uncertainly riddled with opportunities for various actors. Areas and situations 
which were traditionally dominated by nation-states have opened up to non-state actors 
and informal networks. For example, globalization has allowed transnational organized 
crime groups to participate in conflict, especially in Africa. Africa's internal and violent 
conflicts, both intra-state and inter-state, are "characterised by a blurring of the lines 
between war, organised crime and large-scale human rights violations" or more 
specifically "the processes of globalisation have widened the number and type of 
participants" in conflicts 120. These actors range from international and humanitarian 
organizations, multinational corporations, local groups and militias, and criminal 
networks among various others. These groups serve to diminish the historical power and 
clout of the nation-state and inevitably become powerful actors with their own agendas 
and ability to shape the international political economy. 
Africa is full of examples in which government officials and Western countries partnered 
with multinational corporations to exploit the continent's vast natural resources, a 
practice that depicts globalization at its very essence. Globalization encourages 
multinationals to move to regions of the world where lax regulations, cheap utilities and 
119 Federation of American Scientists. 
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labor would allow their industries to function most cheaply121, but this often entails local 
populations and businesses being uprooted by these powerful multinational corporations. 
A side-effect of this exploitation, unfortunately, is that they allow organized crime groups 
to gain a foothold on the economies of these countries, inevitably perpetuating the cycle 
of exploitation, Consider for instance the case of the Ogoni people of the southern Delta 
region of Nigeria and Shell, one of the largest oil producing companies in the world and 
one of eight oil producers situated in the Delta region. When Shell and these other 
corporations expressed concern about infringements by the local Ognoi population that 
could potentially decrease oil output, the outraged Nigerian government brutally stopped 
peaceful Ogoni protests in addition to killing countless Ogonis who voiced their concerns 
about the environmental havoc the oil companies were causing to their land. Many local 
Ogonis who had already lost their livelihood, now lost their lives in order to ensure that 
the oil companies could efficiently continue their operations, despite the blatant 
environmental damage occurring to the traditional farming and fishing communities in 
the Delta region. Azogino refers to incidences such as these as 'crimes of neo-
colonialism', where an already impoverished population is further entrenched in poverty 
as globalization takes away sources of income for local groups in favor of large profitable 
multinational corporations. Oil accounts for 80% of the Nigerian states' revenue, much 
of which bypasses the pressing social needs of the Ogonis in addition to countless other 
ordinary citizens, and directly makes it way into the bottomless pockets of the 
121 Croall explains that corporations typically shop around and are most attracted to regions which include 
low taxes, lax environmental laws, weak worker health and safety regulations, and an abundance of cheap 
labor. See: Hazel Croall, "Transnational white collar crime", in James Sheptycki and Ali Wardak, eds., 











Chapter 3 Globalization and the Impact of Technology and Neo-Liberalism 
government elite, creating a potentially flammable situation122, It is in these desperate 
situations where criminal networks originate or easily infiltrate in order to derive benefit. 
Oil bunkering, for example, is now a pervasive phenomenon in the Niger Delta as various 
local groups now rely on this illicit activity to survive, 
On a similar note, Jackson sees globalization processes as an explanation for internal 
conflict: for fragile states the implications of globalization, namely a 'deconstructed 
setting' that allows the participation of many actors, causes the phenomenon of post-
modern conflict which is inherently economic in nature. Various pressures exerted by 
numerous actors, often referred to as entrepreneurs each with their own interests and 
agendas, exploit the situation in order to profit from the conflict123 . This is seen over and 
over again on the African continent, especially in situations where wars concurrently 
result in mass suffering for the citizenry but unprecedented revenue for the state and 
insurgent groups and often entails collusion between the state and criminal agents or the 
widespread usage of illicit activities. Charles Taylor, for instance, was thought to have 
greatly prospered from the Liberian Civil War much of which was funded by the illegal 
sale of natural resources to the tune of $200-250 million annually124. Conflict in Angola 
and Sierra Leone is funded primarily through illicit trafficking of diamonds and mining 
of other precious minerals by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNIT A) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) respectively. These situations, 
whereby states and political groups rely on illicit activity to finance their agendas serve to 
122 Agozino, 127-9. 
123 Jackson, 37. 
124 R.R. Laremont, Ed. The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa. (Portsmouth: 
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entrench criminal groups and make them indispensable associates of governments m 
terms of revenue generation, unintentionally increasing their power. 
The African criminal enterprises in particular are thought to have benefited more from 
globalization than the traditional cartel and mafia models of organized crime whose 
structures were ill-equipped to capitalize on the changes in the international economy 
with the advent of globalization. Bayart et al. argue that the structural reconfigurations 
globalization has caused for organized crime groups has actually made African criminal 
enterprises more viable by valuing certain factors which are inherent in these African 
groups; the stress on individual success by any means necessary as opposed to strict 
adherence to a hierarchal structure, historical involvement in smuggling and fraud which 
was expanded through various globalization processes, traditional well-developed 
artisanal skills like mining, in addition to the potential and growing size of a domestic 
market for various narcotics all serve to benefit the African Criminal Enterprises more so 
that the traditional major drug organizations 125. Thus the African Criminal Enterprises, 
especially the Nigerian organizations, have in a relatively short period of time established 
themselves as powerful contenders in highly competitive illicit markets such as heroine 
and cocaine trafficking in addition to becoming undisputed leaders in transnational fraud, 
particularly advanced fee fraud scams. These groups were particularly well equipped to 
the ride the wave of opportunity globalization brought to various shores around the 
world. 
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Globalization has allowed criminal networks to become powerful contenders in conflict, 
war, and other political situations; arenas which were once dominated by the nation-state. 
Because globalization has knocked down barriers to profit-making, various groups now 
have the potential to generate large amounts of revenue and consequently wield 
unprecedented influence. With globalization already weakening and diminishing the 
sovereignty and power of the nation-state, transnational organized crime groups are quick 
to capitalize on the opportunities presented to them by the weakening of the state 
structure. These opportunities are typically in the form of technological advances in 
addition to economic liberalization, both discussed in further detail below. 
3.3 New technology and communications in West Africa 
The idea of globalization as time and space compression which has rendered the world 
into a borderless community that is forever open for business and where rivals have 
transformed into competitors, has serious ramifications for Africa. The continent is 
clearly on the losing end of the new business propositions offered by globalization and 
even countries such as Nigeria, who are considered industrial powers and pivotal states 
on the continent have not fared well in the international political economy. Mwakikagile 
provides an illuminating example of Africa's bleak present state: In 1965, Nigeria was 
richer than Indonesia, and Ghana richer than Thailand. Today Indonesia is three times 
richer than Nigeria, and Thailand five times richer than Ghana. Incidentally, Indonesia 
was also a former colony which like many African states secured its independence post-
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gross domestic product than all of the forty black African nations combined126. Thus the 
current state of economic desperation in Nigeria, despite the abundance of resources and 
possibility, coupled with the implications of globalization provides a compelling 
rationalization for the prevalence of advanced fee fraud as well as various other forms of 
transnational organized crime. To adequately explain how globalization has increased 
the prevalence of these crimes, specific components of globalization need to be focused 
on. These components range from the spread of technology to neo-liberal economic 
reforms, both which will be further extrapolated in order to better understand what 
globalization means for transnational organized crime activity in general and 
transnational fraud in particular. 
The advent of new technology has had major ramifications on the ability of criminal 
networks to conduct their illicit activities. In a nutshell, technology has allowed illicit 
transactions to be conducted efficiently and anonymously. Consider for instance the 
evolution of technology and its relation to advanced fee fraud scams as an example of 
efficiency. These scams were initially conducted by post and for scammers to be able to 
successfully bait victims mass amounts of letters would need to be printed, sealed, 
addressed, and correctly stamped for international postage to carefully selected 
individuals and businesses in addition to waiting for positive replies which would again 
need to be communicated by post. The arrival of the fax machine allowed scammers to 
omit many of the tedious steps involved in the postal scams in addition to expecting 
speedier replies to their propositions. The introduction of email, however, was nothing 
short of revolutionary and now 419 scammers had instantaneous access to countless pools 
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of victims at a fraction of the cost. Similarly, other financial crimes, money laundering 
for example, now enjoy unprecedented ease due to various advancements in technology 
as do the traditional organized crimes such as narcotics and human trafficking. These 
illicit activities have benefited from advancements in the shipping system, primarily the 
advent of intermodal commercial shipping, which standardized the process and allowed 
shipments to be tracked online l27 , 
The internet is undoubtedly the most revolutionary invention and is instrumental in the 
daily logistics and communication avenues for organized crime groups. The internet 
allows these groups regardless of their commodity or service, to communicate with 
anonymity. The use of encrypted e-mail in addition to other sophisticated ways of 
disguising records of contact serve to aggravate law enforcement efforts and help 
criminal groups evade capture. The Federation of American Scientists predict that in the 
future the most ominous threats in terms of transnational organized crime will likely 
come from small criminal networks who are technologically advanced and, via electronic 
manipulation of markets and computer theft, may severely destabilize international 
fi . I k dId'" 128 manCIa mar ets an re ate mstItutIons . Interestingly, the Nigerian Criminal 
Enterprises who are already among the leaders in illicit transnational fraud activity via 
electronic methods are well-positioned to be at the forefront of such future activity. 
Globally, breakthroughs in communications provide unprecedented flexibility and have 
benefited both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Today transnational criminals are 












Chapter 3 Globalization and the Impact of Technology and Neo-Liberalism 
able to effortlessly and instantaneously liaise with one another, and in terms of advanced 
fee fraud with victims, via various methods provided through the world wide web; email, 
internet chat rooms, and instant messaging clients, many of which can be further 
encrypted for anonymity, Sim cards and cell phones whose numbers are constantly 
switched ensure further layers of protection for criminal groups in addition to methods 
for erasing and disguising records of activity. In terms of communication within the 
West African region, in 2006 there were 21 million mobile cellular users in Nigeria, the 
highest number on the African continent. Nigeria further had 1535 internet hosts with 
approximately 1.7 million internet users. Currently Nigeria is home to 69 airports, 1 
heliport, and 194,394km of roadway. Compare this to neighboring Ghana who in 2004 
had 1.695 million cell phones and 384 internet hosts. Sierra Leone in 2003 had 113,200 
cell phone users and 277 internet hosts. Cote d'Ivoire rivals Nigeria somewhat with an 
estimated 2.19 million cell phones in 2005 and 2015 internet hosts which boasted 
300,000 internet users129, Overall, Nigeria appears to be the communications leader in 
the region and there appears to be ample opportunity for communication within West 
Africa and beyond as the necessary technological foundations have been laid down and 
are growing. These examples, on a crude scale may begin to explain rates of current 
involvement with advanced fee fraud scams whose contemporary methods of operation 
are entirely dependant on the availability of such technology. 
3.4 Neo-liberal agendas: privatization and deregulation in Nigeria 
The imposition of the neo-liberal agenda, like that of the Washington Consensus and 
various Structural Adjustment Programmes, on the African continent is believed to have 
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aggravated the widespread havoc and dismal standards of living that is characteristic of 
the overwhelming majority of African states. Neo-liberalism, which places primary 
importance on the market system, refers to "a resuscitation of the laissez-faire policies 
that were popular in some circles in the nineteenth century" but were generally 
recognized as insufficient in light of America's Great Depression13o. However, since the 
1980s these policies have been imposed on Africa's developing economies and the 
liberalization and privatization initiatives that were thought to benefit Africa in the long-
run, and provide immediate benefits for the imposing institutions, instead played a 
considerable role in the prevalence of transnational organized crime. Numerous West 
African countries have willingly and unwillingly adopted these development strategies 
either with the intention of becoming viable players in the global political economy or 
simply to qualify for funds from the Bretton Woods institutions. Corall contends that the 
neo-liberal economics and the promotion of profit maximization, deregulation, and 
market freedom " ... provides the ideological and legal space for crime to flourish" and 
both globalization and crime aspire to generate profit and achieve certain levels of 
commodification \31 • Thus, one of the unforeseen complications of these economic 
strategies is that they create favorable environments which allow transnational organized 
crime groups to flourish. The Federation of American Scientists explains the advantages 
of economic and trade liberalization for transnational organized crime groups: 
Increasing economic interdependence has both promoted and benefited from 
reforms in many countries opening or liberalizing state-controlled economies with 
the intention of boosting trade and becoming more competitive in the global 
marketplace. Criminals have taken advantage of transitioning and more open 
economies to establish front companies and quasi-legitimate businesses that 
facilitate smuggling, money laundering, financial frauds, intellectual property 
130 Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, 74. 
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piracy, and other illicit ventures. Multilateral economic agreements reducing trade 
barriers in North America, Europe, Asia, and other regions of the world have 
substantially increased the volume ofintemational trade132. 
Trade liberalization, which entails the opening up of borders and the lifting of various 
restrictions in order to fulfill supply and demand mechanisms, logically increases the 
volume of trade across those borders. The dark side of trade liberalization, then, or an 
unintentional implication is that transnational criminal networks suddenly find 
themselves presented with numerous opportunities and methods for transporting their 
illicit goods. These groups are efficiently and with minimal risk l33 able to adequately 
respond to market demands for goods irrelevant of geographical boundaries. This is most 
beneficial for the traditional organized crimes that focus on trafficking assorted 
commodities and Marchand explains that "Trade liberalisation as a part of the state-
driven regionalisation processes can facilitate the regionalisation of gun-running, drug-
trafficking and criminal networks,,134. This is especially evident in West Africa, which 
has had many efforts for regional integration dominated by Nigeria, and where organized 
crime which originated in Nigeria soon spread across the region as Nigerian criminals 
traveled to neighboring countries simultaneously recruiting and exploiting the local 
populations. In a similar vein, relaxations on immigration or the increased transnational 
travel associated with globalization allow organized crime that is traditionally domestic 
to broaden its scope and expand to countries that exhibit favorable conditions. This is 
more relevant to transnational fraud, where fraudulent activity would be most amicable in 
132 Federation of American Scientists. 
133 Consider the example cited by Nairn: In terms of volume we are currently experiencing unprecedented 
travel and trade. For instance, 550 cargo containers pass through the port of Hong Kong alone on a daily 
basis or Heathrow Airport in London which receives 1,250 flights per day which is equivalent to 63 million 
passengers annually. Uncovering trafficking of various commodities like people or narcotics under these 
circumstances is akin to 'finding a needle in a haystack'. See: Nairn, 77. 











Chapter 3 Globalization and the Impact of Technology and Neo-Liberalism 
countries with weak law enforcement, weak laws regulating financial criminal activity, 
numerous financial institutions of questionable reputation as well as ubiquitous 
corruption. These factors would allow fraudsters and scammers to conduct their 
activities with minimal risk of interference from law enforcement and allow criminals to 
easily bribe officials or even recruit them into their scams. Globalization would allow 
transnational fraudsters to easily move and relocate their activities to favorable countries 
as need be. This is often the case with Nigerian 419 scammers who are found in various 
countries of West Africa such as the Kakudu group who conscious of the lack of 
computer crime legislation and inadequacy of the Sierra Leonean police operated 
numerous successful scams from within Sierra Leone's borders. This predominately 
Nigerian group defrauded various European victims with alluring propositions involving 
gold and diamonds and used their substantial profits to legitimately invest in merchandise 
imported from Nigeria to the capital Freetown. Furthermore the Kakudu group had 
regional ties to neighboring countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Gambia. 135 The 
Kakudu group is a prime example of how organized crime groups exploit the 
globalization processes by shopping around for favorable jurisdictions with minimal 
threat of prosecution. 
According to Bayart et aI, African governments profit criminally from liberal economic 
reforms, such as privatization and deregulation, through the establishment of hidden 
power structures that exploit the legitimate means of coercion allowing for illegitimate 
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accumulation136. In other words, many neo-liberal reforms provide avenues in which a 
state with questionable intentions can exploit for the purposes of personal accumulation. 
Corruption, then, can be intensified by liberal economic reforms in countries such as 
Nigeria which already face epidemic proportions of illegitimate activity" by government 
officials. Theoretically illicit profiting could occur when a state-owned company goes on 
the market and governments in collusion with shady agents agree to a mutually beneficial 
sale. 
Or, as explained by the Federation of American Scientists, privatization opens up various 
opportunities for organized crime groups to gain entrance into the formal economy: 
Through investments in legitimate enterprises, criminal organizations can gain 
substantial interests in, or even control over, critical sectors of the national 
economy. Criminally controlled or influenced businesses have ready access to 
considerable amounts of interest-free capital to invest in productive enterprises, 
an advantage legitimate businessmen do not have. Such unfair competition may 
put legitimate business enterprises at a competitive disadvantage. Criminal groups 
tend to invest more in high-volume cash-flow businesses that provide good cover 
for money laundering or contraband smuggling. Business enterprises influenced 
or controlled by criminal groups also put them in position to "steal" legitimate 
government and business revenue. Moreover, companies controlled by organized 
crime frequently create cost overruns or demand kickbacks in sectors such as 
bl ' k . 137 pu IC wor s projects . 
According to Hazel Croall, globalization can be cnmmogemc because " ... many 
economically and socially harmful activities find space to flourish in the climate of 
deregulation and have become morally justifiable in the context of global neo-
136 Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 20-21. 
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liberalism" 138. Included in this notion of neo-liberalism is the concept of liberalization 
which generally entails the lifting of restrictions in various arenas of the economy. The 
liberalizing of public services is a typical move in the neo-liberal agenda and Nigeria is 
currently undergoing mass liberalization in various service sectors< The privatization 
initiatives pioneered by the Obassanjo administration have been met with much 
opposition but currently Nigerian commercial and merchant banks, cement companies, 
oil companies including Unipetrol Nigeria and African Petroleum were among the first to 
undergo privatization efforts. Additionally, comprehensive other privatization initiatives 
encompassing telecommunications, electricity, ports, airlines and airports, railways and 
other sectors such as the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Company Ltd and the 
National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria are also currently underway. Privatization 
processes often have problems related to transparency and the procedure can be inclined 
to manipUlation. Nigeria typically relies on the auction method in which enterprises are 
awarded to the highest bidder. This can be problematic in that the highest bidder may not 
have the expertise to successfully take over operations and may have a personal 
agenda 139. Privatization allows private actors with significant revenue to gain access into 
lucrative and essential services, many of whom in developing nations will likely have 
gained the necessary revenue through illicit means mainly because of the lack of 
legitimate income making opportunities. Groups that specialize in transnational fraud 
will be especially facilitated by privatization of the banking sector, discussed in the next 
138 James Hardie-Bick, James Sheptycki, and Ali Wardak, "Introduction: Transnational and comparative 
criminology in a global persecpective", in James Sheptycki and Ali Wardak, eds., Transnational and 
Comparative Criminology. (London: Glasshouse Press, 2005): 11. 
139 Adedolapo Akinrele, Privatisation and deregulation in Nigeria - A paper delivered at the workshop 
organised/or the occasion a/the visit a/the Canadian lHinister/or International Trade and his delegation 
in Lagos, (2002) [Online]. Available: 
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chapter, and telecommunications, discussed below, which constitute the lifelines essential 
to successfully conducting their activities. 
Deregulation of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria was aimed at increasing the 
country's teledensity or the availability of phone services which was achieved in 1992 by 
Decree No. 75 of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC). Since then, the 
NCC has witnessed exponential growth in this area as private entrepreneurs have been 
able to gain entrance into what was traditionally an impregnable sector. The NCC has 
since granted 200 private operating licenses many of which include internet service 
'd 140 prOVl ers . It is not inconceivable to believe that these deregulation efforts would 
benefit transnational organized crime groups and the availability of extensive 
telecommunications, especially access to the internet, is likely to have facilitated much 
advanced fee and transnational fraud activity originating in Nigeria. Furthermore, 
advanced fee fraud became an international issue during the 1990s which coincides with 
the deregulation of Nigeria's telecommunications industry. Advanced fee fraud is 
dependant on the availability of adequate communications structure both in the 
originating region and beyond and as this chapter has shown the implications of 
revolutions III communication associated with globalization are instrumental III 
understanding current rates of transnational fraud originating in Nigeria. 
The next chapter will be a continuation of the effects of neo-liberal economic agendas on 
Nigeria and its repercussions on transnational fraud and the related financial crime of 
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money laundering. The chapter will focus on the deregulation of the financial industries 
both from a global perspective and the unintended criminogenic implications for the 
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4: Deregulation of International Financial Markets 
Today the international financial markets are powerful arenas facilitating various 
transactions ranging from bonds to foreign exchange in our globalized economy. 
However, with the advent of various reforms these markets have unintentionally become 
essential tools for organized crime groups to move their funds as necessary or conceal 
substantial illicit profits. On the state-level, how individual nations chose to regulate 
their financial sectors is of pivotal importance. If states are unable to adequately regulate 
these arenas they potentially may become failed or weak states which are susceptible to 
being overrun by organized crime groups, Deregulation of the international financial 
markets has opened up these markets to various actors and deregulation in individual 
states, often imposed through international banking institutions on developing nations, 
have had similar effects. 
4.1 The international financial markets and the impact of deregulation on the 
financial sector 
Deregulation entails the lifting of restrictions and the minimizing of governmental or 
institutional involvement in a specific arena. Thus financial sector deregulation is the 
lifting of various governmental regulations in areas such as the exchange rate, interest 
rate, monetary policy as well as banking and capital market reforms. Common 
deregulation reforms typically include the revocation of laws concerned with limiting 
foreign exchange and foreign involvement in domestic markets inevitably linking the 
domestic financial sector to the international financial markets. The three major 
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bonds, Capital markets are the securities market which includes the stock and bonds 
markets, These markets, in addition to various others, serve as arenas for sellers and 
buyers, or those who have capital and those seeking to acquire capital, to trade financial 
products 141 , Globalization has entailed two major changes to these international financial 
systems in the past fifteen years via financial sector deregulation which includes capital 
market liberalization, These changes include that of size and scope, with exponential 
growth in assets of various leading monetary institutions as well as unprecedented 
interconnectedness caused by open economies and financial sector deregulation which 
has allowed local banks, domestic stock markets, and financial companies to coalesce 
with various partners across the globe, Thus monitoring and regulating these new 
developments which now transcend local boundaries has become progressively more 
difficult and complex 142, Furthermore the distinction between domestic financial markets 
and international markets has become increasingly indistinguishable and due to 
unprecedented rates of international investor involvement in domestic markets, many of 
these domestic markets have arguably become internationalized, 
The imposition of neo-liberal economic policy on the financial sector of various 
developing nations by the major international financial institutions has been detrimental. 
These policies operate under the assumption that unaided market forces or profit motives 
will naturally drive the economy to efficiency, which is based on Adam Smith's invisible 
hand theory, However, full efficiency can only occur when certain conditions such as 
141 Michael P Todaro, Economics for a Developing World (New York: Longman, 1992),440-44 L 
David Begg, Stanley Fisher, and Rudiger Dornbusch, Economics Second Edition (Maidenhead: McGraw-
Hill, 1987), 11-15. 
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property rights, established courts, competition, and the widespread availability of 
accurate information are all present Developing countries typically lack these 
prerequisites and IMF imposed reforms in one area without timely and sufficient reforms 
in adjacent areas can aggravate economic situations 143. Stiglitz refers to this as the 
problem of sequencing, of which capital market liberalization and privatization advocated 
in structural adjustment programmes represent 'tragedies' for developing countries144• 
Capital market liberalization, or the lifting of regulations that inhibit the flow of short-
term capital, can make a developing country's economy risky and volatile. Liberalization 
in this sector can be particularly detrimental in developing countries because the lower 
income earners generally suffer the most due to the lack of adequate safety nets in place. 
Capital market liberalization allows hot or speculative money to enter and exit a 
country's economy almost instantaneously in order to take advantage of interest rate 
changes consequently resulting in instability which scares off long-term investment. 
However, the lack of controls on the flow of short-term capital benefits those looking for 
uncommitted and quick investments as liberalization would entail the lifting of minimum 
time requirements for investing. Minimal taxes on capital, lax regulations regarding 
disclosure of information, and few banking regulations on capital flows additionally 
make it easier and cheaper for capital to flow in and out of a country 145 • These 
developments would also provide flexibility for various actors, including transnational 
143 This is similar to the theory of the Second Best. The theory refers to full efficiency as economic nirvana 
which is best served through laissez-faire policy. However, because economic nirvana or the fulfillment of 
all necessary conditions such as maximization of profit and utility is unattainable, government regulation in 
certain areas of the economy becomes necessary. See: Steven Suranovik, The theory o/the second best, 
(2004) [Online]. Available: http://internationalecon.com/vl.O/chl00/100c030.html [2006, November 13]. 
144 Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents, 74-75. 
145 Joseph Stiglitz, Capital market liberalization and exchange rate regimes: Risk without reward, (2002) 
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organized cnme groups needing to either temporarily stowaway proceeds of illegal 
activity or quickly launder illicit money, discussed in further detail later. 
4.2 Deregulation in Nigeria and implications of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
Deregulation of the financial sector in Nigeria has been a tumultuous process and can be 
traced to the mid 1980s which included the establishing of a two-tier foreign exchange 
market subsequently resulting in the establishment of bureaux de change in 1988. 
However, in 1994 bureaux de change were suspended and exchange controls 
reintroduced. This was reversed shortly after in 1995 with the introduction of 
autonomous foreign exchange markets. In terms of monetary policy, the interest rate 
followed a similar course with deregulation in 1987 and reinstituting of interest rate 
controls in 1991. These controls were lifted in 1992 but again reintroduced in 1994. In 
terms of the banking and capital market, 1987 marked the beginning of liberalization in 
this arena with deregulation of bank licensing, followed by the relaxation of bank 
portfolio restrictions in 1988. In 1991, however, there was an embargo on bank licensing 
and supervision and regulation of banks increased. The privatization of banks and the 
deregulation of the capital market began in 1992 and 1995 included capital flow 
l'b l' . 146 I era lzatlon . Currently however, Nigerian elite appear to be instituting a 'de-
privatization' process in the banking sector and Enueuga explains this is due to the belief 
among the political elite, unhappy to compete with various actors, that they have been 
146 The International Development and Research Center, Appendix: An outline of the financial sector 
reform in Nigeria. (2004) [Online]. Available: http://www.idrc.calen/ev-56359-::WI-I-DO_TOPIC.html 
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denied their spoils. Thus plans to buy back government stakes in three of Nigeria's 
largest commercial banks are underway147. 
In order to qualify for loans from the IMF and the World Bank, countries are often 
required to undertake certain economic actions in exchange for funds l48 , Known as 
Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs), these conditional contracts often impose 
detrimental neo-liberal economic requirements on developing nations, including financial 
sector deregulation. Nigeria, for example, beginning in 1986 has undergone massive 
transformations such as the modernization of its banking system and the blocking of 
excessive wage demands in order to curtail inflation. Furthermore, Abuja negotiated a 
debt-relief deal which was aimed at eliminating Nigeria's debt, estimated at $37 billion. 
The deal required Nigeria to first repay $12 billion of its debt to bilateral creditors which 
would then allow it to buy back the remaining debt stock at a discount in addition to 
being subject to more stringent IMF reviews l49. Nigeria, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, has also undergone mass liberalization efforts, including capital market 
liberalization. Akinrele explains: 
Perhaps the single most significant occurrence in the nation's liberalization 
process was the deregulation of its financial sector, particularly with the repeal in 
1995 of the Exchange Control Act, the principal legislation then regulating 
foreign currency related transactions. The Act was replaced by the Foreign 
Exchange (Monitoring & Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree of 1995, which 
permits any individual or corporate body to invest in any Nigerian enterprise or 
security with foreign currency or capital imported into Nigeria through an 
147 Chidozie Emenuga, The outcome offinancial sector reforms in West Africa, (2002) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.idrc.calenJev-56356-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html [2006, November 14]. 
148 The World Bank, which aims at eradicating poverty, provides SAPs to developing countries but only 
upon approval of the IMF who typically attach various conditions on the loan. See: Stiglitz, Globalization 
and its Discontents, 13-14. 
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Authorised Dealer (a bank or other non-banking organization so licensed by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria) either through telegraphic transfer, cheques or other 
negotiable instrument I SO • 
According to Emenuga, financial liberalization reforms outlined by SAPs for West 
African countries such as Nigeria and Ghana" ... commenced in these countries on a 
background of macroeconomic imbalance and financial distress". They were aimed at 
increasing interest rates which would increase private savings and inevitably growth. 
However, rising interest rates in developing countries have little effect on savings 151 . 
The IMF and World Bank economic reforms ignore the greater social and political 
contexts and the narrow recommendations put forth by these institutions, including 
financial deregulation in the absence of certain prerequisites, serves to both jeopardize 
the larger social fabric and undo whatever stability exists in developing states. Stiglitz 
explains that "Financial market liberalization unaccompanied by an appropriate 
regulatory structure is an almost certain recipe for economic instability,,152. 
While many critics attribute the unfavorable economic conditions spawned by SAPs and 
other attempts at market-oriented reforms as responsible for creating environments in 
which illicit activity can flourish, other critics actually believe those very economic 
conditions are illicit. Croall criticizes the lending practices of many of the world's 
prominent financial institutions such as the World Bank, and believes their impact in 
many developing countries are clearly criminogenic. The increase in inequality and 
poverty during the 1990s in various parts of world, including Africa, can be attributed to 
150 Akinrele, 2. 
151 Emenuga. 
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SAPs " ... mainly as conditions of debt financing from the IMF, World Bank, and foreign 
governments, and often to refinance unconscionable loans made to palpably corrupt and 
repressive regimes." Forced conditions ranging from free trade to privatization have 
achieved the opposite of promised economic growth and poverty appeasement. And 
" ... the more consistent outcomes have been deeper poverty and inequality, increased 
unemployment, prolonged recessions, and denial of access for ordinary people to the 
most basic rights, such as food, housing, education, and safe drinking water." I 53 
Furthermore, the support of foreign industries which are typical conditions in loans from 
international financial institutions in these developing areas are often associated with 
widespread environmental damage and loss of income revenues to local populations, as is 
the case of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta. Interestingly, Croall points out these 
humanitarian situations violate the UN Declaration on Human Rights which prohibits the 
deprivation of people from their subsistence, making the lending practices of such 
institutions violations of international law and potentially criminal154• 
4.3 Money laundering: a related financial crime 
Money laundering, like forms of transnational fraud especially advanced fee fraud, 
involves similar methods of operation and relies on the usage of financial institutions, 
especially banks, to successfully function. Money laundering is often described as a 
reflection of rates of organized crime activity and is typically the final step taken by 
organized crime groups to utilize their profits and pass them off as legitimately acquired 
funds. Once substantial profits from illicit activities have been made, criminals need a 
153 Kelsey, 12. 
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way to incorporate the profits into the formal economy without arousing suspicion. Thus 
money laundering, often believed to be the bread and butter of organized crime groups, is 
an essential feature of most illegal activity, including advanced fee fraud. Money 
laundering is traced back to 1932155, while some experts have even uncovered ancient 
monetary transactions resembling the laundering process l56 . Consequently, like many 
other transnational organized crimes money laundering is not a new phenomenon but 
globalization, through the deregulation of financial markets, has opened up the 
international banking system and made it simpler and quicker to layer and integrate 
substantial sums of money. According to the UNODC, an estimated $500 billion to $1 
trillion of dirty money is believed to go through the laundry cycle annually. The IMF 
estimate is much higher; approximately $1. 8 trillion, or 5% of the global economy, is 
thought to be laundered through the international financial system yearlyl57. And when 
money laundering becomes easier and more efficient, the utilitarian value of engaging in 
illegal practices increases, arguably leading to an increase in various forms of crime. 
Furthermore, because organized cnme groups need to process and stowaway large 
amounts of money, nations with nominal governmental regulations become the most 
attractive to launder money through. Consequently these nations, typically developing 
countries, become increasingly associated with shady business dealings and appear 
155 Tive, 94. 
156 According to Morris-Cotterill, merchants in China would hide their wealth from rulers by converting 
their profits from trade into easily mobile assets which were cashed in various jurisdictions and 
subsequently invested into other businesses. These techniques, still used by contemporary money 
launderers, are more than 3000 years old. See: Nigel Morris-Cotterill, "Money Laundering" Foreign 
Policy, 124 (2001): 16-22 [Electronic]. Available from JSTOR at: http://links.jstor.orgisici?sici=0015-
7228%28200105%2F06%290%3A 124%3CI6%3AML%3E20CO%3B2-P [2006, October 29]: 16. 
157 D.H Walters, Tracking money laundering via telecommfi'aud, (2002) [Online]. Available: 
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unappealing to legitimate forms of business thus halting development and entrenching 
these states further into various forms of organized crime activity. This explains the 
current situation with Nigeria today where the lifting of foreign exchange controls as a 
part of the financial deregulation process has allowed substantial amounts of currency to 
both enter and leave the country much of which is illicitly laundered by unscrupulous 
financial institutions, government officials, and organized crime groups. Additionally, 
the widespread advanced fee fraud scams have given Nigeria such a bad reputation 
globally that legitimate business ventures and genuine local entrepreneurs will typically 
find it difficult to secure partners and funds abroad. International investors will likely be 
wary of doing business in Nigeria due to the very real risks of being scammed158. 
Unfortunately, this is detrimental to the already ailing Nigerian economy which could 
benefit greatly from responsible foreign investment. Thus the average Nigerian finds 
himself trapped in a difficult situation where illicit means often appear to be the only 
means of survival. 
According to Nairn, "money launders were probably among the quickest to adapt to 
financial liberalization and integration in the 1990s" and hastily discovered the dizzying 
array of new opportunities and avenues to launder money159. Placement, layering, and 
integration are the three steps in any money laundering transaction; the process begins 
with the placement of profits, whereby dirty money is inserted in various realms such as 
banks, financial institutions, or even gold and art. Layering, the second step, occurs 
when illegal profits are added to the legal profits of a legitimate business or cash-
IS8 Tive, 130. 
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intensive front companies established specifically for laundering purposes in order to 
camouflage its origins. In West Africa the most popular front-companies include second-
hand car dealerships, clothes boutiques, and diamond trading set-ups 160. The internet in 
particular has resulted in various opportunities for organized crime groups to set up 
virtual front companies ranging from online auctions, gambling, and pornography sites. 
The last step is integration where the money is then used to purchase shares in legitimate 
companies successfully erasing the true origins of the illicit money. Recent advances in 
the financial markets have created a wide array of financial instruments which serves to 
enhance the mode of operation of transnational organized crime groups. Money launders 
can not only move money between banks regardless of geography effortlessly but can 
now choose various financial instruments to place, integrate, and even invest their illicit 
profits. Globalization, via economic liberalization including financial sector deregulation 
has made each stage of money laundering easier and increasingly efficient. For example, 
Nairn explains the interconnectedness of illicit and licit money now possible due to the 
current state of international financial markets: 
... swift movement of money is one of globalization's benefits. Money 
laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion, and fraud take place amid foreign 
direct investment, portfolio investment, immigrant remittances, credit card 
transactions, e-commerce, and more. The trouble is that the interweaving of licit 
and illicit activity offers money washers camouflage within the global financial 
system on which we all depend 161. 
In the early days of money laundering, criminals had limited avenues in which to store 
their illicit funds and offshore bank accounts typically served as havens. However, 
offshore havens are no longer located on distant tropical shores but are now widely 
160 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African region. 29. 
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available even in the most metropolitan areas. These havens offer their customers 
anonymity and confidentiality, low taxes, as well as lax supervision and regulation of 
deposits. Approximately 10% of 'hot money' in offshore havens is the proceeds of 
organized crime activity, while the overwhelming majority of funds are used for tax 
avoidance and evasion purposes 162. And today, " ... money laundering does not occur 
exclusively through the banking system" but "non-banking financial organizations" are 
also susceptible 163 . Furthermore, the globalization of the financial sector has allowed for 
effortless transfers of money from unregulated jurisdictions to regulated jurisdictions, 
much of which is conducted via internal branches of the large financial organizations164, 
Jurisdiction hopping, or the exploitation of different laws and regulations in varying 
areas, is one of the realties of globalization that transnational criminal groups utilize to 
facilitate illicit activity and can provide transnational criminals such as money launderers 
a certain degree of immunity from prosecution. 
Interestingly, many countries may not pursue serious anti-money laundering legislation 
or may purposely prescribe to lax enforcement of such laws because enforcement may be 
contrary to the best interests of these governments. F or example, taking substantial 
action to curtail money laundering can be expensive and time-consuming, it could 
potentially limit the competitiveness of the nations financial markets, encourage capital 
flight to less scrutinized areas, and in states with rampant corruption it may even be 
162 Croall, 230, 
163 Tive, 99. 
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adverse to the personal interests of the elite165 , The last reason in particular appears to be 
applicable to Nigeria which has repeatedly seen its political elite squander national funds 
and with the help of shady financial institutions deposit the money in oversees bank 
accounts. General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha among countless other 
Nigerian officials and government elite have all utilized the banking industry in particular 
to blatantly pocket state revenue for personal usage. However, the current Obassanjo 
administration appears to be committed to curtailing high-level corruption and has 
implemented various anti money laundering laws which would inhibit the transfer of 
significant sums of illicit money. As a result, in 2006 the Financial Action Task Force 
(F ATF), a task force of 33 members seeking to reduce the international financial systems 
vulnerability to money laundering by proposing international standards for the financial 
industry, removed Nigeria from the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) 
list. The F ATF, which created the list in 1998, put Nigeria on the list in 2001 due to what 
was considered major shortcomings and weaknesses in its financial system due 
specifically to the inadequacies of its 1995 Money Laundering Law. Before this law was 
revised in 2002, predicate offenses for money laundering were limited to criminal 
activities involving drugs, many non-banking financial institutions were exempt from 
general anti-money laundering laws, and few customer identification requirements 
existed for banks. Further revisions and amendments were made in subsequent years 
which according to the F ATF improved Nigeria's financial sector including stricter bank 
licensing requirements which reduced the number of commercial banks from 89 to 25. 
While Nigeria was removed from the NCCT list in 2006, the F ATF still plans to monitor 
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progress in the country with a particular focus on investigating and prosecuting 
incidences of money laundering, protecting staff in related agencies from corruption, and 
judicial reforms facilitating prosecution of money laundering cases166. 
4.4 How has deregulation affected transnational fraud? 
Financial sector deregulation and capital market liberalization in Nigeria which began in 
the 1980s, concurrent with Nigeria's intense involvement with various forms of 
transnational organized crime, has opened up this previously regulated arena to various 
actors as well as revolutionized the rate at which financial capital can be moved around. 
The reduction of foreign exchange controls in Nigeria beginning the 1980s likely 
facilitated the over-invoicing phenomenon created by the oil boom, which brought in 
substantial sums of illicit money into the country much of which was redirected to the 
oversees bank accounts of government elite, and is widely regarded as a precursor to 
Nigerian advanced fee fraud. Furthermore, the opening up of various financial markets 
has theoretically allowed organized crime groups with profits to spare to act as lenders 
and intermediaries and groups in search of funds can become borrowers. These 
developments serve to facilitate the workings of transnational organized crime groups by 
allowing them unprecedented opportunities and avenues to conduct both large and small 
scale financial crimes. Nigeria, like many other developing countries, lacks adequate 
institutional controls on its financial sector. These shortfalls include unsophisticated 
banking regulations which are unable to track suspicious financial transactions, 
166 Interestingly, only Myanmar remains on the NCCT list for 2006. See: Financial Action Task Force 
(F ATF), Annual review of non-cooperative countries and territories 2005-2006, (2006) [Online]. 
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insufficiently enforced anti-money laundering laws as well as susceptibility to corruption. 
Organized crime groups are quick to capitalize on these shortcomings: Japan's recent 
financial crisis for example, was linked to the Yakuza organized crime group's 
penetration into the unregulated banking sectorl67 . 
Nigeria's experience with financial sector deregulation has been a messy and unsteady 
one which arguably serves to benefit transnational organized crime groups who may be 
able to take advantage of the confusion of laws and regulations. Emeneuga explains that 
increases in fraud were seen with banking liberalization which began in 1987 and marked 
the beginning of a 200% increase in financial institutions most of which were small and 
undercapitalized. These new financial institutions lacked the necessary expertise and 
availability of long-term management making the newly emergent banking sector 
inefficient, risky, and prone to fraud 168 . According to the UNODC, Nigeria additionally 
experienced a substantial increase in unlicensed finance houses during 1988 to 1991 
which corresponds to the beginning of deregulation of the banking sector including the 
relaxations on licensing and portfolio regulations which were subsequently revoked. 
These unlicensed houses typically serve as ideal stages for money laundering and related 
financial crimes as do a handful of other established banks. The Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCl), for example, is believed to have partnered with corrupt 
167 Allan Castle, Transnational organized crime and international seclIrity, (1997) [Online]. Available: 
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elite in the West African region allowing these individuals to move substantial sums of 
'11' . b d169 lICIt money a roa , 
Nairn outlines four major financial reforms and adaptations which governments across 
the globe found 'fashionable' during the 1990s which had significant implications for 
organized crime groups involved in transferring and laundering money. The first was the 
discarding of exchange controls so that permission from a governmental authority to 
convert local currency into foreign currency and vice versa was no longer needed. Thus 
the international daily volume of exchanged currency mushroomed from $590 billion per 
day in 1989 to approximately $1.88 trillion per day in 2004. Additionally, the combining 
of European currencies into the euro was perceived as " ... good news for money 
launderers, tax evaders, and the like, because it expands the playing filed, adds flexibility, 
and multiplies the opportunities" 170 • Morris-Cotterill predicts that the euro will replace 
the dollar as the currency of choice for money launderers because its substantial domestic 
user base rivals that of the dollar in addition to the easy movement and recognition of the 
euro throughout the European Union l7l . Secondly, Nairn cites the development of open 
local capital markets which were a natural result of the lifting of foreign exchange 
controls as a major advancement in the transnational organized crime realm. Foreign 
owned local banks, the ability for non-citizens to engage in local stock exchanges, and 
the courting of once-restricted foreign multinationals all served to increase the volume of 
money floating around which presented new opportunities for criminal groups to 
169 UNODC, Transnational organized crime in the West African region, 29. 
170 Nairn, 135. 
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'piggyback' their illicit money into the licit economy and camouflage their illegitimate 
transactions. Thirdly, the increased competitiveness characteristic of a wide array of 
actors, ranging from countries to banks to wire transfer intermediaries spawned by 
deregulation, resulted in organized crime groups suddenly finding themselves with an 
unprecedented number of avenues and willing partners to launder their illicit proceeds172. 
Lastly and most obviously, the technology which drives the international financial 
markets was promptly embraced by both governments and banks allowing for 
instantaneous and cheaper transactions. This had numerous benefits particularly for 
groups dealing with transnational fraud because monetary transactions were now 
instantaneous and geographic location rendered irrelevant 173. 
In terms of the promotion and prevalence of white collar or economic crimes, financial 
deregulation is believed to be linked with the efficiency by which finance capital can be 
moved around, ultimately making many related crimes more viable 174 • And as Smith 
explains "Opportunities for licit wealth creation enabled by the growth of transnational 
commerce, the deregulation of international markets and the construction of continental 
trading blocs ... also establish abundant opportunities for illicit transnational 
commerce ... ,,175. Thus advanced fee fraud, which entails the transfer of substantial sums 
of money from one country to another, would be greatly impacted when these monetary 
transactions became easier. Furthermore, the usage of banks and financial institutions as 
172 Consider for example, Carousal fraud of V AT in the UK. 
173 Nairn, 134-137. 
17-1 Croall, 229. 
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tools for illicit activity serves to threaten their integrity. The Federation of American 
Scientists explains: 
The use of banks and financial institutions to launder money and for other illicit 
financial transactions undermines their credibility. Poorly capitalized banks 
established by criminal organizations weaken the banking system and may 
increase the likelihood of a major domestic financial crisis. A weakened banking 
system increases the danger of domestic liquidity crises and can magnify the 
impact of foreign financial shocks on the economy. These developments can 
undermine confidence in a country's financial system, leading to extensive capital 
flight and depriving the country of investment resources. If the financial system 
is closely integrated into global financial markets, the risk of contagion--the crisis 
spreading to other countries-- increases 176. 
Nigerian banks and other financial institutions offering international wmng services 
located in the West African region have repeatedly been used for illegitimate purposes 
not only by transnational criminals but by high-ranking government officials. Because of 
the widespread prevalence of corruption in the area, there is a significant demand for 
unscrupulous financial institutions or employees in legitimate institutions willing to 
facilitate illegal transactions. Unless this demand is curtailed, organized crime groups 
and other individuals will continue to weaken and exploit the banking sector. 
Both transnational fraud and money laundering rely on similar methods of operation and 
thrive on banks and other financial institutions as intermediaries facilitating dirty money 
transactions. Advances in these arenas, especially in terms of deregulation which results 
in lax enforcement of rules and various openings for private actors, provide a beneficial 
environment for the workings of organized crime groups. Globalization, which 
inevitably entails the adoption of technological advancements linking together previously 
unlinked areas and deregulation in historically regulated areas, allows transnational 
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5: Understanding the Transnational Organized Crime Threat 
Researchers from the Australian Institute of Criminology humorously lament the fate of 
victims of advanced fee fraud: "In the end, one can only wonder at the greed and 
stupidity of people prepared to part with money in response to an unsolicited letter, 
offering them millions of dollars, from a stranger on the other side of the world" 
177 However, advanced fee fraud and its related variant scams are more than just 
profitable cons; these scams serve as impediments to stability in the areas in which they 
originate and further represent examples of the ability of transnational organized 
criminals to evolve and exploit the phenomenon of globalization. Additionally, advanced 
fee fraud often serves as a gateway crime and illicit funds made from these scams are 
used to perpetrate other illegal criminal activities. On the other hand, to perpetrators and 
sympathizers advanced fee fraud against developed nations represent retaliation for 
colonialism and the slave trade and thus are justified in light of righting historical 
wrongs. However, it is ordinary Nigerian citizens struggling to earn a sufficient living 
who are adversely affected by the activities of these Nigerian fraudsters in addition to the 
implications of Nigeria being seen in the global realm as a defunct and criminal state. 
5.1 Generalizations regarding transnational crime for Nigeria 
As explored earlier, Nigeria is particularly susceptible to incidences of advanced fee 
fraud for reasons relating to population demographics, institutional vulnerabilities, and 
the repercussions of globalization, summarized below: 
177 Russell G. Smith, Michael N. Holmes, and Philip Kaufmann, Australian Institute of Criminology: 
Trends and issues in crime and justice: Nigerian advanced fee fraud, (1999) [Online]. Available: 
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Demographics ripe for crime 
Transnational organized crime, including advanced fee fraud, is so pervasive within 
Nigeria because of the prevailing socio-political and economic conditions within the 
state. A quick history of post-colonial Nigeria uncovers civil wars, military coups, ethnic 
and religious tensions, corrupt leadership, and contested claims to natural resources all of 
which aggravate instability. Lack of sufficient income earning opportunities and 
widespread poverty coupled with blatant examples of official looting all facilitate an 
acceptance of illicit activity as a means of generating income. Demographically 
speaking, the availability of unemployed yet skilled workers in addition to unskilled 
workers allows for the perpetration of technical and white-collar criminal activity, like 
advanced fee fraud, in addition to providing established organized crime groups with a 
sufficient pool of potential recruits. Nigeria, being the most populous African country 
and an undisputable regional hegemon, has also instigated crime throughout the West 
African region and is currently seen as the global leader for the perpetration of advanced 
fee fraud. 
Institutional vulnerabilities 
Historically, various institutions III Nigeria have been susceptible to corruption and 
willing to coalesce in clearly illicit activities. Banks and other financial institutions are 
among the main culprits who have laundered staggering amounts of money on behalf of 
corrupt rulers, as are government agencies and civil servants such as those who would 
rather pocket a levy on narcotics passing through Nigeria's ports instead of prosecuting 
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government adopted the practice of over-invoicing imported goods resulting In 
substantial sums of money entering the state and subsequently the pockets of 
unscrupulous employees. Official involvement in the illicit practice of oil bunkering is 
also suspected and an estimated 300,000 barrels of oil are stolen on a daily basis from the 
Niger delta, equivalent to 35% of Nigeria's oil exports, and subsequently sold for 
considerable profits on the black market 178, Furthermore, certain changes in Nigeria's 
economic sector with the advent of globalization have allowed criminal groups to play 
influential roles as well as open up various avenues which have indirectly facilitated 
illicit transnational activity. Premature privatization and deregulation initiatives as part 
of larger liberalization reforms have allowed transnational organized crime groups to take 
full advantage of less regulated arenas especially in terms of banking regulations and 
foreign exchange controls. Criminal groups find it easier to establish front-companies, 
launder money globally, get involved in essential legitimate services, and reduced trade 
barriers allow for the expeditious movement of both illicitly trafficked people and 
commodities. 
A new globalized terrain 
Ancient and well-established transnational trade and ethnic networks in Nigeria and the 
greater West African region were well positioned to benefit from the advent of 
globalization. Criminal groups found themselves on vast frontiers seeping with 
opportunity which enhanced the logistical operations of illicit activity, the ability to shop 
around for favorable jurisdictions, and technological advancements such as the internet 
178 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 8, 13. 
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allowed for efficient communication as well as the abandoning of traditional tools in 
favor of wireless ones. Nigerian advanced fee fraudsters, for example, switched from fax 
and post to email in the distribution of their 419 propositions. New realms of organized 
crime activity were suddenly possible and cyber-crime and organized crime developed a 
mutually sustaining relationship. Advances in global financial systems, specifically 
interconnectedness and increased competition, provided organized crime groups 
countless avenues to launder and stowaway illicit profits. Transnational organized crime 
groups even transformed their structure and began to represent business enterprises as 
opposed to the traditional hierarchal models in order to maximize profits and 
productivity. These new decentralized networks coalesced with related criminal 
networks sharing both information and resources on unprecedented scales. Diversifying 
of criminal activities among these groups is now more common than specialization as 
organized crime networks move into market niches as they become available; for 
example advanced fee fraud is often a gateway crime which provides Nigerian fraudsters 
funds for involvement in other profitable illicit activities. Overall, globalization 
presented transnational organized cnme groups with various tangible benefits which 
facilitated their methods of operation. 
5.2 Conditions exacerbating transnational organized crime in West Africa 
In today's globalized world, nation-states are no longer immune or unaffected by 
situations in surrounding states. Therefore, the following is an analysis of various 
conditions throughout West Africa which serve to facilitate and promote the incidences 
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Instability in the greater West African region 
Nigeria's regional neighbors have no less of a tumultuous history and West Africa has 
been home to some of the most shocking atrocities of recent times. Civil wars in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone involved the systematic use of children as murderous rampaging 
soldiers, citizens in many West African countries lived under the arbitrary rule of 
illegitimate tyrants and threats of military coups, and all the countries in the region179 
struggled to come to terms with their colonial past and disadvantageous positions in the 
global political economy. Wars and armed conflict are particularly detrimental because 
according to the UNODC, in many states in Africa" ... the existence of armed conflict has 
encouraged certain forms of organized crime to flourish under the guise of political 
struggle"lSO in addition to creating widespread misery and desperation among the local 
population. Today, a staggering proportion 0 f the West African population, estimated at 
55%, currently live on less that $1 a day lSI. This poverty is exacerbated by severe 
inequality and the looting of government revenue by kleptocratic rulers, forcing many of 
the citizens in the region with bleak futures to explore other income making avenues. 
Throughout the regions history, unfavorable economic conditions forced many of the 
West African states to seek funds from international institutions, namely the IMF and the 
World Bank, in order to perform basic state functions. The international institutions 
offered these ailing economies SAPs on unequal terms and these programs, focused on 
maximizing agricultural capacity to the detriment of welfare services, were unwillingly 
incorporated into local economies. Thus declines in education, health, and state 
179 With the exception of Liberia, which was never under colonial rule. 
ISO UNODC. Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 3. 
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employment were widespread due to cuts in state spending l82 causmg additional 
dissatisfaction and hardship among the average citizens in the region. Furthermore, the 
weaknesses and failures of the criminal justice systems in many of the states in the region 
served to heighten the system's sense of illegitimacy among the local populations. 
During the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone for example, many of the rebel groups 
destroyed various aspects of the criminal justice system including police stations and 
courts, perhaps to signify the eroding of the state authority. Subsequent rebuilding efforts 
have been slow and characterized by corruption causing the establishment of vigilante 
groups and transnational political party militias which only serve to intensify insecurity 
and instability throughout the region183 . Today in every country in West Africa, law 
enforcement agencies, related state services, and the judiciary are believed to be 
substandard and inadequate, which in turn has serious implications for the perpetration of 
illicit activity throughout the region 184. 
West African involvement in transnational organized crime activity 
Though Nigeria is widely perceived as the regional hegemon m terms of illicit 
transnational criminal activity, many other neighboring states in West Africa also boast 
flourishing trades in various illicit activities. West Africa's permeable land borders, 
extensive and unpatrolled sea ports coupled with institutional corruption at all levels of 
the government provide a favorable climate for the perpetration of various illicit 
activities. Illegal diamond trading, for example, typically begins in Sierra Leone and is 
trafficked through Liberia and Guinea and on to its target markets. Ghana, Liberia, and 
182 UNODC. Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 3. 
183 Wannenburg, 9. 
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Cote d'Ivoire all provide illicitly mined gold to markets around the world. Liberian rebel 
groups extract rubber and are involved in the internationally banned logging trade while 
Equatorial Guinea is involved in extensive timber and ivory trafficking. In terms of drug 
trafficking, Liberia, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire finance arms in exchange for 
domestically produced cannabis while Ghana is also a major producer of the illicit crop. 
For heroine and cocaine trafficking, West African criminal networks use local ports to 
traffic the drugs in collusion with international syndicates. Nigeria has been replaced by 
neighboring ports as a transit route of choice for traffickers due to increased patrols and 
cancellation of flights from the country. In terms of human trafficking, West Africa's 
turbulent history provides vast pools of vulnerable citizens, many of whom have been 
internally displaced and are desperately seeking refuge elsewhere. Human trafficking in 
the region is endemic and virtually every West African state is involved either as a 
country of origin, transit, or destination. Estimates state approximately 200,000-300,000 
children are trafficked within West Africa each year and victims transported outside the 
region typically earn traffickers anywhere between $10,000-$50,000 per person. 
Firearms trafficking is also in great demand throughout West Africa resulting in the 
perpetuation of various inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, and 
Ghana are all thought to be manufacturers of firearms which are sold throughout the 
region and these arms subsequently circulate elsewhere often finding themselves into the 
hands of rebel groups and criminal gangs. Fraudulent scams such as advanced fee fraud 
which initially originated in Nigeria have undergone a regionalization process and now 
these scams are finding favorable ground in Gambia, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togol85. Money laundering has also flourished in the region due to the presence of 
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unlicensed finance houses and favorable mediums in the laundering process which 
include previously owned car dealerships, which requires minimal documentation, in 
addition to the diamond trade 186. Thus, West Africa is a region which is deeply 
entrenched in domestic and intra-regional criminal activity which, in the climate of 
globalization, inevitably spills over into other areas in the search of suitable markets and 
in the spirit of supply and demand. Additionally, many of these illicit activities finance 
rebel movements equipped with political agendas which in tum challenge established 
governmental authority and breed instability. Thus the vicious cycle of instability giving 
rise to criminal activity which subsequently aggravates instability is perpetuated. 
Difficulties in ascertaining reliable crime statistics 
Reliable crime statistics for the West African region are hard to come by and statistics 
distinguishing routine criminal activity from organized crimes are rarely recorded by 
police agencies or other law enforcement administrations from within the region. Thus 
various other sources such as NGOs, foreign governments, think-thanks, and interest 
groups are typically relied on to paint a picture of the rates of organized crime in West 
Africa. However, these crime statistics are to be approached with caution and typical 
obstacles to sufficiently and accurately analyzing the numbers include the 'continuity 
problem' and the 'congruity problem'. The former refers to how crime definitions and 
thus measurement techniques change over time while the latter refers to the absence of 
standardized reporting formats which is especially compounded in cross-national 
comparisons 187. Both these discrepancies serve to complicate statistical research in 
186 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 29. 
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various sub-fields of criminology. Furthermore, the politicization of crime statistics, 
where a government may exaggerate the extent of a crime to justify a punitive policy or 
underestimate a crime in order to suggest their competence in social control issues in 
addition to countless other scenarios, is another obstacle to sound criminological 
research. In the case of Nigerian organized crime, many researchers contend that the 
United States typically overestimates the extent of various transnational criminal 
activities originating from the country. For example, estimates of advanced fee fraud 
profits are typically higher for American organizations in comparison to othersl88 . The 
distortions and lack of consensus regarding rates of global illicit activity serves as an 
exasperating condition for transnational organized crime because law enforcement and 
other personnel charged with curtailing such activity do not have an accurate picture of 
the threat. Without knowing the exact nature of the threat, reactions will either be 
minimal and inefficient or overextended and wasteful. 
5.3 Transnational organized crime groups as threats to the nation-state 
Globalization has enabled organized crime groups to morph into influential, resource-rich 
networks and develop a transnational character which has consequently allowed global 
criminal groups to enter realms typically restricted to powerful nation-states. For 
example, transnational organized crime groups have become increasingly involved in 
conflict, as have other non-actors, especially within the African context. Areas 
characterized by conflict, for instance the oil rich Niger Delta, often include a wide range 
of actors such as criminal gangs, large multi-national corporations, government officials 
susceptible to corruption, and a vulnerable disenfranchised local population claimed to be 
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represented by prominent NGOs and humanitarian groups. The promotion of non-state 
entities and the involvement of such a wide array of actors can be interpreted as an 
affront to state sovereignty especially in terms of transnational organized crime groups 
whose agendas are typically incompatible with legitimate governments. Therefore, 
transnational organized crime networks represent threats to the nation state. In other 
situations such as Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone, governments in collusion with 
criminal groups share similar agendas or criminal groups are disguised as political parties 
or revolutionary freedom fighters, such as UNITA in Angola or Sierra Leone's RUF. 
These groups are involved in illicit trafficking of diamonds and mining of precious 
minerals which provides significant revenue streams used to promote a political agenda. 
Furthermore it is often believed that "Governments in less-developed countries that are 
already weak will be further weakened as the illicit networks operating inside their 
territory amass large fortunes,,189 and accumulate the resources needed to gain political 
and economic clout. Thus the overlapping of state and non-state actors in arenas 
traditionally dominated by the nation-state is a byproduct of the globalization process and 
in the African context has severe repercussions; the most disturbing being the entrance of 
transnational organized crime groups as powerful contenders in the international political 
economy. 
Transnational organized cnme IS typically viewed as the result on new criminal 
opportunities many of which were created in the climate of globalization19o. This new 
189 Nairn, 263. 
190 Vincenzo Ruggiero, "Global markets and crime", in Margaret E. Beare, ed., Critical Reflections on 
Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
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climate, spawned in the 1980s corresponded with the increasing prevalence of 
transnational organized crime in certain areas of the world, which subsequently 
experienced a global surge in the 1990s. According to experts, the upward trend in 
incidents of global crime is likely to continue into the foreseeable future 191 • Especially as 
globalization concurrently and paradoxically intensifies both disparities and economic 
opportunities around the world, making the rich richer and poor poorer, transnational 
criminal groups will continue to exploit and flourish under these conditions. In order to 
counter this mounting threat, however, ethical leadership is of paramount importance in 
regions whose governments lack legitimacy in the eyes of the people, and for the rest of 
world, responsible and equitable management of the implications of globalization is 
essential. 
5.4 The pivotal role of ethical leadership as a criminal counter-force 
As Chinua Achebe noted two decades back: 
The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is 
nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or 
anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its 
leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which 
are the hallmarks of true leadership192. 
This scathing analysis of leadership is not only applicable to Nigeria but to many other 
nations whose unscrupulous and corrupt leaders shoulder a great deal of responsibility for 
the abysmal state of their nation and people. It is because of corruption and a widespread 
environment of lawlessness that transnational organized crime has successfully gained a 
191 Nairn, 263. 
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stronghold in these states l93• General Sani Abacha, for instance, turned a blind eye to the 
prosecution of white collar crime and even provided impunity to organized criminal 
gangs many of whom subsequently provided election funds and voters l94. When heads of 
state show interest in illicit means for generating income and promoting agendas, normal 
citizens, especially when economic opportunities are scarce or inadequate, may also tum 
to illicit means in order to ensure a minimal standard of living. 
Historically, West Africa has been a counter-example of ethical leadership and has 
instead provided countless instances of corrupt, unscrupulous, and greedy leaders. 
Legitimate governments who strongly reject illegitimate means and activities provide 
exemplars for their citizenry and promotion of these governments is crucial in 
overcoming criminal networks. Take for example Palermo, Sicily which was once 
deeply entrenched mafia terrain but has since been purged and was recently the site of the 
ratification of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime which for the 
first time outlines international standards for various illicit activities in addition to 
19-providing guidelines for law enforcement agencies) Thus, transnational organized 
crime can be curtailed if leaders charged with ensuring the wellbeing of their citizenry 
refuse to lower themselves to involvement in illicit activity and if law enforcement in 
these countries are trained and equipped with the necessary tools to fight and investigate 
as well as ward off threats of corruption. While it is unlikely that all illicit activity will 
193 Nairn explains that transnational organized crime is a political phenomenon and that "Illicit traders 
cannot prosper without help from governments or accomplices in key public offices ... the enormous 
incentives associated with the profits involved in these trades drive this criminalization of politics and 
public service." See: Nairn, 240. 
194 Alex Schmid, Troubled lands where criminals are king, (2001) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.unesco.org/courier/2001_02/ukldoss8.htm [2006, November 14]. 
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ever cease, tangible steps can be taken to reduce the profitability and ease of illicit 
activity and increase the threat of prosecution. 
And like much conflict today, transnational organized crime develops roots in areas of 
economic uncertainty and disparity. Criminal groups can step in where weak 
governments fail in terms of the social sector by providing desperately needed goods and 
services and even employment opportunities to the local population. Once successful at 
home, these groups will likely have gained the expertise and desire to supply other more 
profitable markets. It is subsequently the opportunities created by globalization, coupled 
with favorable domestic factors, as exemplified by Nigeria, which have allowed 
organized crime groups to take on a transnational character and expand into the 
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